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This Article applies a simple graphic technique, which I call route
analysis,' to problems of credibility and hearsay. Route analysis facilitates
the examination of the role that a given piece of evidence plays in the
proof of an uncertain factual proposition. The focus of this Article is on a
particularly important type of evidence-a person's declaration or other
conduct that tends to prove the truth of a proposition because the person
asserts the proposition or his conduct otherwise indicates he believes it to
be true. This Article assumes, as a working premise, that such declara-
tions or other conduct, whether in court or out of court, can be analyzed
by the same technique used for other types of evidence. I hope to demon-
strate that this premise is correct by reaching intuitively appealing yet
nontrivial results; some of these results are quite general, while others
concern specific recurrent issues of evidence law, such as the Hillmon
doctrine.
* C Copyright 1987, Richard D. Friedman. All rights reserved.
t Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. In writ-
ing this Article, I have benefited from the comments, suggestions, criticisms, and encouragement of
many people, especially Ronald Allen, David Kaye, Richard Lempert, Peter Lushing, Paul Shupack,
Stewart Sterk, Peter Tillers, Jack Weinstein, and Susan Wolf.
1. I presented the technique in a previous article, Friedman, A Diagrammatic Approach to Evi-
dence, 66 B.U.L. REv. 571 (1986) [hereinafter A Diagrammatic Approach].
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A simple illustration will help clarify the working premise. Donald is
accused of murdering Victor. After presenting other evidence, the prosecu-
tion offers indisputable proof that a smoking pistol bearing Donald's fin-
gerprints was found near Victor's still warm body. A juror can evaluate
the probability that Donald is the murderer by asking three questions: (1)
"How probable did I think it was, before I heard this evidence, that Don-
ald was the murderer?" (2) "How probable is it that the gun and finger-
prints would show up if Donald were the murderer?" (3) "How probable
is it that the gun and fingerprints would show up if Donald were not the
murderer?"2 Now suppose that instead of the smoking pistol the prosecu-
tion offers the testimony of Wendy that she saw Donald plug Victor. I
will show in this Article that the juror's analysis of a case like this one is
similar to that of the smoking pistol case. The juror's first question is
identical to that in the pistol case, and the other two are very similar:
"How probable is it that this evidence-Wendy's testimony-would arise
if Donald were the murderer?" and "How probable is it that the testi-
mony would arise if Donald were not the murderer?"
Answering those two questions is the essence of evaluating the credibil-
ity of an in-court witness or of an out-of-court declarant. The last ques-
tion-asking the probability that a given declaration would be made not-
withstanding its falsity-is particularly difficult and complex. The
perceived difficulty of answering that question without having heard the
declaration made and subjected to cross-examination is the principal
source of the rule against hearsay.
Route analysis aids examination of these questions by setting out chains
of circumstances that might have led to a given declaration. This makes
possible a comprehensive and rigorous analysis of credibility, enabling an
observer to avoid mistakes like those of such acute observers as Professor
John Kaplan' and Professors Lea Brilmayer and Lewis Kornhauser.
4
Furthermore, with a simple extension, route analysis provides a far more
powerful and flexible tool for analyzing hearsay than the celebrated testi-
monial triangle first presented in the legal literature by Professor Lau-
rence Tribe.5
2. See id. at 582-84.
3. Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1086-91
(1968); see infra Appendix B.
4. Brilmayer & Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions, 46 U. CHI. L.
REV. 116 (1978); see infra text accompanying notes 42-43 and Appendix D.
5. See Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARv. L. REv. 957 (1974). Professor Tribe's comment
is quoted at length in R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELREID & E. KIONKA, MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY
OF EVIDENCE 427-29 (1983); E. GREEN & C. NESSON, PROBLEMS CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EVIDENCE 279-82 (1983); J. KAPLAN & J. WALTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 87-89
(5th ed. 1984); J. WEINSTEIN, J. MANSFIELD, N. ABRAMS & M. BERGER, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON EVIDENCE 550-51 (7th ed. 1983). Others present the testimonial triangle in somewhat modified
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Section I of this Article reviews some of the basics of route analysis and
the measurement of probative value.' Section II applies route analysis to
credibility evaluations and Section III extends the analysis to hearsay. I
have attempted to make the text as nontechnical as possible. Some more
formal mathematical analysis does lurk at the bottoms of a few pages and
in the Appendices. I believe that this analysis is significant and instructive;
if, as I contend, assessing the credibility of a witness or an out-of-court
declarant involves consideration of probabilistic questions, then the mathe-
matical theory of probability can aid the analysis. I have put the mathe-
matical discussions to the side, however, so that they do not clutter the
way for readers less technically inclined.
I. ELEMENTS OF ROUTE ANALYSIS AND THE MEASUREMENT OF
PROBATIVE VALUE
The basic method of route analysis is to represent both known and un-
known propositions as nodes, with arrows between them indicating
probability assessments. By examining the routes going through all known
propositions, we can determine the probability of an unknown
proposition.
Figure 1 is a simple route diagram, representing a simple situation.
Mornings in the city of Omphalos are either cloudy or not cloudy, and
afternoons are either rainy or not rainy. In the diagram, o represents our
base of information;7 CLOUDY represents the proposition that a given
morning is cloudy in Omphalos; RAINY represents the proposition that the
afternoon is rainy. The prefix NOT- represents the negation of a proposi-
tion; thus, NOT-CLOUDY is the proposition that the morning is not cloudy
and NOT-RAINY the proposition that the afternoon is not rainy.
Now suppose that we know the probability of a cloudy morning, which
we represent by P(CLOUDY). From this, we know what P(NOT-CLOUDY)
form. E.g., M. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE 79-83 (1983); R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN
APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 350-64 (2d ed. 1982); Graham, "Stickperson Hearsay": A Simplified Ap-
proach to Understanding the Rule Against Hearsay, 1982 U. ILI. L. REV. 887. Professor Ronald
Allen has pointed out to me that the testimonial triangle bears a familial resemblance to the "Triangle
of Reference" presented in the classic work, C. OGDEN & I. RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF MEANING
10-12 (8th ed. 1946 & supplementary essays 1956); Malinowski, The Problem of Meaning in Primi-
tive Languages, in C. OGDEN & I. RICHARDS, supra, at 323-25 Supp. As compared to Ogden and
Richards, Tribe gives the triangle, especially its base, a somewhat different meaning, and puts it to an
altogether different purpose.
6. Those who have read A Diagrammatic Approach, supra note 1, or a second article, Friedman,
A Close Look at Probative Value, 66 B.U.L. REv. 733 (1986) [hereinafter A Close Look] may find it
unnecessary to work through this Section. This Section's review is concededly sketchy; those who find
that it leaves questions unanswered may wish to consult the previous articles.
7. In other words, o represents the "origin" of the problem, or everything we know about the
world other than the propositions separately identified.
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FIGURE 1
is, because P(CLOUDY) + P(NOT-CLOUDY) equals one: the morning is
either cloudy or not cloudy, but not both. Similarly, suppose we know the
probability, given the assumption that the morning is cloudy, that the af-
ternoon will be rainy. This we represent as P(RAINY given CLOUDY). And
by definition P(NOT-RAINY given CLOUDY) equals 1 - P(RAINY given
CLOUDY). Finally, suppose we know the probability, given the assumption
that the morning is not cloudy, that the afternoon will be rainy. This is
P(RAINY given NOT-CLOUDY), and by definition P(NOT-RAINY given
NOT-CLOUDY) equals 1 - P(RAINY given NOT-CLOUDY). 8
Given all this information, we may wish to determine P(RAINY), the
probability of afternoon rain as determined before knowing anything
about the weather on the particular morning. There are two routes to
RAINY, one through CLOUDY and one through NOT-CLOUDY, and so the
probability that events will reach RAINY by one route or the other is the
sum of the probabilities for each of the two routes. The probability for the
first route is P(CLOUDY) X P(RAINY given CLOUDY), and the probability
8. More formal notations substitute a vertical line to represent "given," a character or symbol
(e.g., N or -) to represent the negation of a proposition, and single letters, rather than words, as
proposition names. The notation used here is designed to ease the path for readers who are not
conversant with formal probability work, without, of course, affecting the validity of the analysis. The
mathematically inclined are invited to read "P(RINC)" for "P(RANY given NOT-CLOUDY)." In the
appendices, the more compact notation is used.
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FIGURE 2
for the second route is [1 - P(CLOUDY)] X P(RAINY given NOT-
CLOUDY).9 Thus,
P(RAINY) = P(CLOUDY) X P(RAINY given CLOUDY) (1)
+ [1 - P(CLOUDY)] X P(RAINY given NOT-CLOUDY).
This is what I call a prospective problem-determining the probability,
from the perspective of one point on a route diagram, that a proposition
represented farther to the right ° is true. To learn that the morning is
cloudy is to receive prospective evidence in determining the likelihood of
afternoon rain, because RAINY is represented farther to the right of
CLOUDY on this diagram.
Prospective evidence is important in many adjudicative situations."1
More important, however, and the focus of this Article, is what I call
retrospective evidence. Suppose, for example, that we arrive in Omphalos
on a rainy afternoon. Given the afternoon rain, what is the probability
that the morning was cloudy; that is, what is P(CLOUDY given RAINY)?
To analyze this proposition, we can use a diagram that dispenses with
one of the nodes of, and so is even simpler than, Figure 1; we already
know that RAINY is true, so we need not worry about NOT-RAINY or the
9. Recall that I - P(cLouDY) equals P(NOT-CLOUDY).
10. One proposition may be represented farther to the right of another if it is later in time or
logical sequence. For a discussion of such sequences and the placement of the nodes, see A Diagram-
matic Approach, supra note 1, at 588-91.
11. For example, in a personal injury case, the jury may have to determine how great the plain-
tiff's earnings will be given her injury, and also how much she would earn if she were not injured.
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routes leading to NOT-RAINY. In Figure 2, we should imagine ourselves at
RAINY. We know that events began at o and have reached RAINY. The
question is, "How did we get here from there?" As the prospective analy-
sis has shown, there are two routes by which events could go from o to
RAINY, the first through CLOUDY and the second through NOT-CLOUDY.
Suppose that, from the vantage point of o, it seemed that events would
more likely travel the first route than the second to RAINY; then if we
know that events have in fact reached RAINY, it is more likely that they
came via the first route, through CLOUDY, than through NOT-CLOUDY.
We can express this in more formal terms by saying that the probability
of CLOUDY, given that RAINY is true, is the probability of the route from o
through CLOUDY to RAINY divided by the total probability of both routes
from 0 to RAINY. In the notation we have adopted,
P(CLOUDY given RAINY) = P(CLOUDY) X P(RAINY &iven CLOUDY). (2)
P(RAINY)
This equation is one form of what is known as Bayes' Theorem. 2 It is
crucial because it lets us express the retrospective probability that we seek
in terms of the prospective probabilities with which we began.
In an adjudication, the factfinder must determine the probability of a
disputed material proposition given all the evidence. In deciding whether
to admit proffered evidence, the judge must assess whether the evidence
appears to have probative value. The probative value of evidence may be
defined as its "tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence."13 A simple formal definition of
probative value essentially restates the verbal one."' Let PV(Y w.r.t. x)
12. The theorem was first presented by an English cleric, Thomas Bayes, in An Essay Toward
Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances, 53 PHIL TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOc'Y 370 (1763),
reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FACSIMILES OF Two PAPERS OF BAYES (1940). For an informal
proof of the theorem and a fuller discussion of it in route analysis terms, see A Diagrammatic Ap-
proach, supra note 1, at 586-88 & n.32. For more general discussions of the theorem, see M. BIZLEY,
PROBABILITY 88 (1957); Cullison, Probability Analysis of Judicial Fact-Finding: A Preliminary
Outline of the Subjective Approach, 1969 U. ToL. L. REV. 538, 545.
13. FED. R. EVID. 401.
14. See A Close Look, supra note 6, at 738. But see Kaye, Quantifying Probative Value, 66
B.U.L. REv. 761 (1986) (criticizing this method of measuring probative value); Friedman, Postscript:
On Quantifying Probative Value, 66 B.U.L. REV. 767 (1986) (replying to Kaye).
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mean the probative value of evidentiary proposition Y with respect to ma-
terial proposition x. Then
PV(Y w.r.t x) = P(x given Y) - P(x), (3)
where P(x given Y) is the probability of x evaluated after introduction of
Y and P(x) is the probability of x evaluated beforehand.
If P(x given Y) is greater than P(x)-that is, if knowledge of Y makes
the truth of x more likely than it would be absent knowledge of Y-then
Y has positive probative value. If Y makes x less probable, it has negative
probative value. Finally, Y has no probative value" if it leaves the
probability of x unaltered. Because P(x given Y) lies between 0 and 1, the
maximum positive probative value of Y is equal to 1 - P(x), indicating
that Y proves x to a certainty, and the maximum possible negative proba-
tive value of Y equals - P(x), indicating that Y absolutely disproves x.16
II. ROUTE ANALYSIS OF CREDIBILITY
A. The Basic Credibility Model
Section I treated evidentiary propositions, such as Y in the immediately
preceding discussion, as if proven to a certainty; only the inferences that
could be drawn from such propositions were left uncertain. In the retro-
spective Omphalos weather problem, for example, we assumed that, al-
though we could not determine conclusively whether the morning had
been cloudy, our evidence-proof of whether the afternoon was rainy or
not-was certain. But of course in adjudication external facts are gener-
ally not proven with certainty. Most often, the jury (or other factfinder)
receives evidence of a proposition through a witness, who may or may not
be speaking the truth. Sometimes, the jury must rely on, in addition to or
instead of a human witness, an instrument such as a thermometer or a
radar speed gun that may or may not be reporting accurately.
Route analysis can take into account the uncertainties created by the
fallibilities of human and non-human witnesses, and in so doing can help
us understand the nature of problems of credibility and reliability.
1"
15. That is, PV(y w.r.t. x) = 0.
16. Substituting into Equation 3, if P(x given Y) = 0, the minimum possible value, then PV(Y
w.r.t. x) - P(x); if P(x given Y) = 1, the maximum possible value, then PV(y w.r.t x) = 1
- P(x).
17. I use "reliability" with reference to non-human "witnesses" that make and report observa-
tions, including instruments like radar guns and thermometers, f. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 204,
at 610-14 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) (admissibility of speed measurement by various devices), and
bloodhounds, see, e.g., State v. Loucks, 98 Wash. 2d 563, 656 P.2d 480 (1983); State v. Porter, 303
N.C. 680, 690, 281 S.E.2d 377, 384 (1981); Annotation, Evidence of Trailing by Dogs in Criminal
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These problems may be analyzed along the same lines as other retrospec-
tive problems of relevance. The question is "How did we get here, TESTI-
MONY(X), from there, o?" where TESTIMONY(X) represents the testimony
by a given witness of fact x, o represents the facts that we know apart
from the testimony, and there are one or more routes from 0 to TESTI-
MONY(X) through x and one or more through NOT-X. We wish to find
P(x given TESTIMONY(X)). 1 8
A traditional model treats a witness' credibility as if one could summa-
rize it by simply stating a probability that a statement by the witness is
accurate. In other words, one could determine for a witness Wilma a con-
stant, C, which equals P(x given TESTIMONY(X)) for any factual proposi-
tion x, without reference to the probability of x assessed apart from the
witness' statement.19 Even as a simplification, this model is grossly inade-
quate. For one thing, as Appendix A shows, it is mathematically incoher-
ent. For another, it leads to the bizarre result that, if x previously ap-
peared to have a probability greater than C, Wilma's testimony of x
would necessarily lower that probability. Perhaps most significantly, the
model provides no basis for treating differently testimony of the truth of
the proposition EMPIRE, "The Empire State Building is standing," and of
CHEESE, "The moon is made of green cheese." Of course we do treat those
testimonial statements differently, even if made by the same witness. In
assessing the accuracy of Wilma's statement as to any proposition x, we
take into account not only her propensity to report accurately but also
Cases, 18 A.L.R.3d 1221, §§ 3, 4 (1968 & Supp. 1984). For the most part, the following discussion
will refer only to credibility of human witnesses. Reliability of non-human witnesses can usually be
analyzed by means similar to those used for examining the credibility of human witnesses, but without
some of the complexities. For example, the reports of a mechanical observer may present problems of
perception and articulateness, but ordinarily not problems of sincerity or (putting computers aside)
memory; if a thermometer indicates that the temperature is 75', we may be concerned that the mecha-
nism is malfunctioning (misperception) or that the gauge is miscalibrated (inarticulateness), but not
that the thermometer is lying or forgetting. Potential incapacities of human witnesses are represented
infra in Figure 6 and listed infra at text accompanying notes 46-48.
18. TESTIMONY(X) is used throughout this Article to represent testimony of a particular witness to
a particular fact x. Thus, in the discussion of Knapp v. State, 168 Ind. 153, 79 N.E. 1076 (1907),
TESTIMONY(HFARD) represents the proposition that a witness (Knapp) testifies that he heard a report
that a marshal clubbed an old man to death. See infra text accompanying notes 32-34.
19. This is the traditional Bernoulli-Boole model adopted in Ball, The Moment of Truth:
Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 14 VAND. L. REv. 807, 827 (1961), and criticized at
great length in L. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 95-107 (1977). A variation assigns
to P(x given TESTIMONY(x)) a value C(x) that depends not only on the witness' credibility but on the
prior probability of the particular proposition x. This appears to be the model adopted in Cullison,
supra note 12, at 592-95, although Cullison is unclear, and may be taking the traditional Bernoulli-
Boole approach. This variation avoids the incoherence and lack of realism that plague the more rigid
model, see infra Appendix A, but it does so at an intolerable price of question-begging: Because we
seek to determine P(x given TESTIMONY(X)), a value for it should not be assumed at the outset. Of
equal importance, the variation does not truly measure the witness' credibility, but only the credibility
of his statement-the probability that x is true given his assertion of it. See infra text following note
30.
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P(x), the likelihood, as assessed apart from the statement, that x is true.
We do this even when the witness is not human. Suppose we have deter-
mined, by measuring against an instrument of known reliability,20 that
95% of a particular thermometer's readings are accurate. Can we then
say, if the thermometer reads 110°F, that it is 95% certain that this is
indeed the temperature? Not if it is February in Minnesota.
Nor does it solve our problem to turn this model inside out and treat
Wilma's credibility as the probability that, given the truth of x, she will
testify accurately-that is, to assign to the witness an index Q equal to
P(TESTIMONY(X) given x).2 ' For one thing, it is obvious that any human
witness is more likely to state certain facts accurately than certain other
facts. 21 If MAIL is the proposition that Wilma has mailed a long-awaited
check, and CHOP is the proposition that she chopped down her father's
favorite cherry tree, it takes no great insight to see that MAIL is more
likely than CHOP to produce truthful testimony by Wilma-that is,
P(TESTIMONY(MAIL) given MAIL) is greater than P(TESTIMONY(CHOP)
given CHOP). Thus, we cannot speak simply of Q, the probability that the
witness will state any fact accurately; rather, we must speak of Q(x)-the
probability that the witness will state a particular fact x accurately.
We can assume comfortably that Q(MAIL) substantially exceeds
Q(CHOP). And yet, even if cHoP is, a priori, no more likely than MAIL, we
are inclined to give far more credence to the confession, "Father, I
chopped down your cherry tree," than to the declaration, "The check is in
the mail." This apparent paradox is not difficult to resolve.
Consider P(TESTIMONY(X) given NOT-X), the probability that a witness
would testify that a proposition is true although in fact it is false. We may
call this probability R(x). Even if Wilma has not mailed the check, she
may have a substantial incentive to say that she has. Thus, it is entirely
plausible that R(MAIL) is quite large, perhaps (if Wilma appears some-
what shifty) nearly as large as Q(MAIL). 23 On the other hand, unless
20. And how, the technical-minded might ask, is this other instrument known to be reliable? It
should suffice if the instrument is a platinum resistance thermometer, calibrated by and tested against
the fixed points of the current International Practical Temperature Scale. See Thermometty, 18 EN-
CYCLOPAEDIA BRrrANNICA: MACROPAEDIA 321, 324-25 (1978). Even then, if we wanted to be abso-
lutely precise (for present purposes, thankfully, we do not need to be), we would have to recognize a
possibility that the thermometer might be in error.
21. Note that P(TEsTiMoNy(x) given x) is not identical to P(x given TEsTIMONY(X)). Indeed, as
Appendix B demonstrates, if the two are equal in a given case, it is only a matter of coincidence. That
Appendix also shows that failure to distinguish between P(TESTIMONY(X) given x) and P(x given
TESTJMONY(X)) seriously impairs the model of credibility offered by Professor Kaplan.
22. This factor need not hold in the same way for non-human witnesses. One can easily imagine
an instrument that accurately measures a condition 95% of the time, the remaining observations being
erroneous because of a malfunction that occurs randomly with respect to the condition being
measured.
23. In other words, a dishonest Wilma may be very likely to say she has mailed the check whether
she has done so or not; that saying so would be lying may deter her little or not at all.
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Wilma is a martyr or a masochist, R(CHOP) is almost certainly far smaller
than Q(CHOP), and indeed close to zero: If Wilma is blameless she has
little or no reason to take the rap. Thus, although she is less likely to
testify to CHOP than to MAIL if both facts are true, if Wilma testifies to
both facts, then CHOP is more likely than MAIL to be true.
We see, then, that in determining the probable accuracy of a witness'
statement that x is true, we must take into account: (1) P(x), the
probability of x as judged apart from the witness' statement of it; (2)
Q(x)-that is, P(TESTIMONY(X) given x), or the probability that the wit-
ness would testify to x if x were accurate; and (3) R(x)-that is,
P(TESTIMONY(X) given NOT-X), or the probability that the witness would
testify to x if x were not accurate. 4
Figure 3 shows how these factors must be combined. This map, show-
ing that events may proceed from o to TESTIMONY(X) either via x or via
NOT-X, is a simple and perfectly general route diagram; indeed, it is iden-
tical to Figure 2, except for the names of the nodes. Thus, ordinary prin-
ciples of relevance for retrospective evidence apply to testimonial evidence.
In a prior article," I have explored these principles in some depth. I em-
phasize here two principles that highlight and sharpen points made in the
preceding discussion.
First, other things being equal, the greater the probability of the dis-
puted proposition before considering the evidence, the greater its
probability after. As applied to testimony, this means that the greater the
prior assessment P(x), the greater is the posterior evaluation of P(x given
TESTIMONY(X))." Thus, one factor in determining the probability that a
witness is testifying accurately has nothing to do with the witness' per-
sonal credibility.
The second factor does focus on the witness' credibility per se. To ex-
amine it requires introduction of another term, often used in probabilistic
analysis of evidence: the likelihood ratio of evidentiary proposition Y with
respect to material proposition x.27 Defined as the quotient P(Y given x)
+ P(y given NOT-X), this ratio tells us whether the truth of Y is more or
less likely (and by how great a factor) given the truth of x as opposed to
the falsity of x. If the probability of the evidentiary proposition Y is
greater given x than given NOT-X-that is, if the likelihood ratio is
greater than one-then the evidence has positive probative value; if the
ratio equals one, the evidence has no probative value; and if the ratio is
24. See supra text following note 2.
25. A Close Look, supra note 6.
26. See id. at 753.
27. See, e.g., Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1021 (1977).
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FIGURE 3
less than one the evidence has negative probative value.2" For a given
prior probability P(x), the posterior probability P(x given Y) is greater if
the likelihood ratio of the evidence is greater; consequently, as the likeli-
hood ratio increases from less than one to greater than one, the probative
value of the evidence increases from a negative to a positive number. 9
The consequence of this for our credibility model is that both the
probability of x given the testimony and the probative value of the testi-
mony vary with the likelihood ratio of the testimony-that is, with the
ratio of (1) P(TFSTIMONY(X) given x), the probability that the testimony
would be made given the truth of x, to (2) P(TESTIMONY(X) given NOT-
x), the probability that the testimony would be made given that x is false.
In the simpler notation we have used, this ratio is Q(x) - R(x).
We can now give this ratio a special name, C(x), meaning the credibil-
ity ratio of a particular witness in testifying to x. C(x) is an ordinary
likelihood ratio, but it obeys one limitation that does not confine most
likelihood ratios. The witness should be at least as likely to testify to x if
it is true as she would be if it is false; indeed, we may well call the wit-
ness a pathological liar if the falsity of x makes her more likely to assert
x. Thus, for most witnesses, Q(x) is at least as great as R(x), and so C(x)
is at least one. A virtually certain consequence of this is that the jury
should be at least somewhat more likely to believe x after hearing the
28. See A Close Look, supra note 6, at 739.
29. See id. at 748-49.
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witness' testimony than it was beforehand;"° one possible exception, based
on the witness' demeanor in giving her testimony, is analyzed in Appen-
dix C.
The witness' credibility in making a statement, denoted by the C(x)
ratio, should be carefully distinguished from what may more loosely be
termed the credibility of her statement. In speaking of the credibility of
the witness' statement of x, I mean nothing more than P(x given TESTI-
MONY(X))-the probability that x is true given that the witness has testi-
fied to it. But as we have seen, the credibility of a witness' statement as to
x depends not only on the witness' personal credibility, C(x), but also on
the prior probability of x, P(x); the more probable x appears before hear-
ing the witness' statement of it, the more probable it appears afterwards.
We can use this general background to give a somewhat more precise
analysis of the four illustrative declarations discussed above. In the Em-
pire State Building case, the prior probability, P(EMPIRE), is already so
close to one that the testimony as to EMPIRE cannot have much probative
value: There is hardly any room to increase the probability of EMPIRE,
and, unless Wilma is not only a pathological liar on the status of sky-
scrapers, but a severe one at that, her testimony cannot decrease that
probability significantly. Wilma's declaration has insignificant value in
the green-cheese-moon case as well, but for the opposite reason. The prior
probability of CHEESE is so minuscule that even if Wilma's credibility,
C(CHEESE), is quite high, P(CHEESE given TESTIMONY(CHEESE)) will still
be tiny. We are far more likely to conclude that Wilma has made a mis-
take, or is joking or lying, than that she has accurately stated the composi-
tion of the lunar landscape.
In the check-in-the-mail case, the probative value of the evidence may
be very slight, but for a reason of a different nature. Unlike the first two
cases, the prior probability of MAIL may well be far from either extreme,
but if C(MAIL) is barely larger than one-because Wilma is very likely to
say that the check is in the mail even if it is not-the question may re-
30. The relationship of the credibility ratio and the prior probability of proposition x to the
posterior probability of x and to the probative value of the testimony may be expressed formally by
adapting two general equations for retrospective evidence presented in A Close Look, supra note 6, at
747-48, and stated there in terms of ordinary likelihood ratios:
C(x)
P(x given TESTIMONY(X)) = C(X) + 1 - P(x) (N1)
P(x)
and
PV(TESTIMONY(X) w.r.t. x) =  P(x) X [1-P(x)] X [C(x)-1] (N2)[P(x) X C(x)] + [1 -P(x)]
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main a close one after the declaration. In the cherry tree case, by contrast,
Wilma's confession will virtually settle the issue of her culpability, even if
previously her guilt seemed unlikely. With R(CHOP) near zero, C(CHOP)
is extremely high, so that P(CHOP given TESTIMONY(CHOP)) is near
one-or put another way, PV(TESTIMONY(CHOP) w.r.t. CHOP) approaches
the maximum of 1 - P(CHOP).31
B. An Illustration and Application: The Knapp Case
The principles discussed above help in understanding the celebrated
case of Knapp v. State. 2 Accused of murdering a marshal, Knapp
pleaded self-defense. To bolster his case, he testified that before the killing
he had heard a report that the marshal had clubbed an old man to death.
When the prosecution offered proof that the old man died of senility and
alcoholism, Knapp objected on grounds of relevance.
Figure 4 shows why this objection was properly overruled. Here, CLUB
represents the proposition that the marshal clubbed the old man to death
and HEARD the proposition that Knapp heard a report of CLUB. TESTI-
MONY(HEARD) represents Knapp's testimony that he heard a report that
the marshal killed the old man; there is no NOT-TESTIMONY(HEARD) node
because the jury knows that Knapp has given this testimony. This dia-
gram introduces a new technique that will be used occasionally in this
Article: a very light arrow indicates a particularly low probability and a
very heavy arrow indicates a particularly high probability.3" Thus, the
arrow from o to CLUB is light and that from 0 to NOT-CLUB heavy, be-
cause absent evidence on point it appears improbable that the marshal
clubbed the old man to death. Similarly, the arrow from NOT-CLUB to
HEARD is light, and that from NOT-CLUB to NOT-HEARD heavy, because
most situations in which no clubbing has occurred do not give rise to a
rumor of clubbing. The arrow from HEARD to TESTIMONY(HEARD) is
heavy, because if Knapp did hear a report of clubbing he would have
every reason to give truthful testimony of the report; the arrow from NOT-
HEARD to TESTIMONY(HEARD) is not particularly light because Knapp
would have a substantial incentive to claim HEARD even if HEARD were
untrue. Thus, C(HEARD), although greater than one, is relatively low.
31. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
32. 168 Ind. 153, 79 N.E. 1076 (1907). I analyzed this problem in part in A Diagrammatic
Approach, supra note 1, at 591-92, but now it is possible to take a fuller view.
33. Principally because of the static nature of print, which does not allow the same efficiency in
presenting variations as does, say, a blackboard, this technique will not be applied uniformly here.
Accordingly, no inference should be drawn as to a particular probability from the fact that it is not
indicated by a very light or very heavy arrow.
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FIGURE 4
The ultimate question is how events proceeded between the two points
known by the jury, from 0 to TESTIMONY(HEARD). They could have gone
through CLUB and HEARD (indicating that Knapp did in fact hear a re-
port, and it was true), NOT-CLUB and HEARD (Knapp heard an untrue
report), NOT-CLUB and NOT-HEARD (Knapp fabricated the report, which
would have been untrue), or-least likely of all-CLUB and NOT-HEARD
(Knapp fabricated a report of the truth).
The prosecution's proof that CLUB is in fact untrue eliminates the first
of these routes (as well as the unlikely fourth), and so "show[s] that some-
where between the fact [NOT-CLUB] and the testimony [TESTI-
MONY(HEARD)] there was a person who was not a truth speaker. '3 4 True,
the falsehood may not have been Knapp's-it may have been that Knapp
heard a report of a clubbing (HEARD), notwithstanding the fact of NOT-
CLUB. Proof of NOT-CLUB has, however, eliminated a route that previously
appeared to be a significant conduit for "traffic" from o to HEARD,
whereas of the routes inconsistent with HEARD only a relatively unimpor-
tant one has been eliminated. It therefore appears substantially more
probable than before that NOT-HEARD is true, so that Knapp's testimony
of HEARD conflicted with the facts.
If Knapp's testimony gained some credence before proof of NOT-CLUB,
so that the HEARD versus NOT-HEARD issue was considered in doubt, the
proof of NOT-CLUB will probably shift the balance substantially toward
34. 168 Ind. at 157, 79 N.E. at 1077.
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NOT-HEARD. The probability that a witness' statement is true depends not
only on the witness' credibility ratio for that statement but also on the
probability, as judged apart from his testimony, that the statement is true.
Here, the jury may be expected to begin with an understanding that
Knapp's self-interest makes his credibility ratio for this testimony quite
low. And the prosecution's proof as to the actual cause of the old man's
death significantly lowers the probability, as judged apart from his testi-
mony, that Knapp heard the report. Together these factors support the
inference that by far the most probable path is one leading through NOT-
HEARD, indicating that Knapp lied on the stand.
C. Reports of Unusual Events and the Multiple Possibilities of
Falsehood
In the credibility problems we have previously considered, we have im-
plicitly assumed that a witness has two options in each case, to speak
accurately or to speak inaccurately. This is essentially true if the witness
is presented a yes-or-no question. But often the question is more open-
ended. We must take into account that, although there may be only one
truth, there are many ways of speaking falsely.
Consider the well-known case of Bridges v. State,3 5 in which defendant
Bridges was accused of molesting a very young girl, Sharon, in his apart-
ment. A material issue was whether Sharon had ever been in the apart-
ment. The prosecution offered the child's declaration 6 describing the ap-
pearance and arrangement of various objects in the apartment, together
with apparently incontrovertible evidence confirming the accuracy of her
description.
Figure 5 suggests why Sharon's declaration was so compelling. Here o
represents the underlying evidence apart from Sharon's declaration, in-
cluding the other proof describing Bridges' apartment. PRESENT repre-
sents the proposition that Sharon was present in the apartment, and DE-
SCRIBE represents the proposition that she accurately describes the
apartment. Assume that Sharon is asked for a description of Bridges'
apartment only after answering affirmatively to a query as to whether she
was in the apartment. This affirmative answer is represented in Figure 5
by the two-section node YES. The YES node is in two sections because the
probability of DESCRIBE given both YES and PRESENT is different from the
35. 247 Wis. 350, 19 N.W.2d 529 (1945).
36. In the actual case, Sharon's testimony was supported by that of other witnesses who repeated
out-of-court declarations that she had made. The principal issue in the case was thus one of hearsay.
See 247 Wis. at 355-57, 19 N.W.2d at 531-32. The discussion in the text puts this factor aside and
concentrates on the probative value of Sharon's own declaration. Understanding of that issue casts
light on the hearsay question as well. See infra note 40.
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probability of DESCRIBE given YES and NOT-PRESENT; on the other hand,
YES is represented as a single node rather than as separate nodes because
in learning YES the jury does not learn whether PRESENT is true or not. In
other words, the jurors know that events have reached the YES node, but
they do not know which section of that node events have reached.
3 7




There are two routes to DESCRIBE, one through PRESENT and the other
through NOT-PRESENT. But, as indicated by the very light arrow from the
NOT-PRESENT section of YES to DESCRIBE, that linkage is so weak-it is so
unlikely that Sharon would give this particular description, among all the
others possible, if she had not actually been in the apartment3 8 -that the
second route appears improbable. If, apart from Sharon's testimony, other
evidence established that there was a substantial probability she had been
in the apartment,39 the conclusion is virtually compelled that the first
37. For a fuller discussion of two-section nodes, see A Diagrammatic Approach, supra note 1, at
612-15. In this diagram there is no need to show the NOT-ESaNOT-DS E nodes, because we
know that YES and DESCRIBE are true.
38. I assume, as did the court, that the circumstances and other evidence made it essentially im-
possible for Sharon to know of the apartment's appearance without having been there. See McCOR-
MICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 17, § 250, at 742. There is of course the possibility that Sharon could
come up with an accurate description of the apartment even without actual knowledge of its appear-
ance, simply by making a lucky guess. If her description were bland and spare-"blue walls, big
radio"-this possibility would have to be reckoned substantial. In fact, although the information pro-
vided by Sharon was mundane, it was sufficiently detailed in aggregate to make the lucky guess
hypothesis unlikely. See 247 Wis. at 355-56, 19 N.W.2d at 531.
39. This factor distinguishes Sharon's case from that of the lottery discussed below, see infra text
accompanying notes 42-43 and Appendix D, where the prior probability-that is, the probability as
assessed before the selector's declaration-that the chosen ticket bears a given number is very small. In
such a case, we can have strong confidence that the selector's announcement is correct only if we
regard the selector as highly credible.
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route was the actual one. And this proposition holds true even if Sharon is
regarded as rather unreliable and therefore likely to report inaccurately. °
The essential point here is that often, if a witness testifies inaccurately,
there is only a small probability that he or she will come up with a partic-
ular false story. We must take this factor into account, especially when the
witness testifies to events that, judged apart from the testimony, seem im-
probable. In such a case, the two low probabilities may be nearly in bal-
ance-that is, the low probability assessment, apart from the testimony,
that the particular story is true, and the low probability, assuming it is
not true, that a falsifying witness would come up with this false story.4x
This factor helps us understand a classic problem that has created some
40. Sharon would be unreliable, for example, if P(YEs given NOT-PRESENT) were high or
P(DESCRIBE given [PRESENT & YES]) were low. Even if she were unreliable on both counts,
P(DESCRIBE given PRESENT), which equals P(YE given PRESENT) X P(DFSCRIBE given [PRESENT &
YEs]), is probably far greater than P(DESCRIBE given NOT-PRESENT), which equals P(YES given NOT-
PRESENT) X P(DESCRIBE given [NOT-PRESENT & YES]), because P(DESCRIBE given [NOT-PRESENT &
YES]) is minuscule. The essential point-that P(DESCRIBE given NOT-PRESENT) is so small, compared
to P(DESCRIBE given PRESENT), that P(PRESENT given DESCRIBE) is probably near one-would apply
even if Sharon's description of the apartment were not in response to a request for a description, or
indeed even if she gave it in circumstances unrelated to the crime. If, for example, while in a trance
Sharon spontaneously gave a description that fit Bridges' apartment exactly, that would constitute
strong evidence, even though she did not identify the apartment or link it to the crime. Sharon's
personal credibility thus has little bearing on the probative value of her statement with respect to the
proposition that she was present in the apartment. Therefore, the court properly held untenable a
hearsay objection to a second-hand report of Sharon's description.
The result should probably be different if Sharon's description were of the spare "blue walls, big
radio" type, for then a jury could not have confidence, absent examination of Sharon, that P(DESCRIBE
given NOT-PRESENT) is negligible. Note also that if Sharon's description had been used to prove not
her presence in the apartment but the proposition that the molestor's apartment fit the description, it
would dearly, as the court recognized, have been hearsay. 247 Wis. at 366, 19 N.W.2d at 536.
For a carefully considered but somewhat less favorable view of Bridges, see Park, McCormick on
Evidence and the Concept of Hearsay: A Critical Analysis Followed by Suggestions to Law Teachers,
65 MINN. L. REv. 423, 437-41, 439 n.50 (1981).
41. Bayes' Theorem helps express this idea more rigorously. According to the Theorem,
P(x given TESTIMONY(X))= (N3)
P(x) X P(TESTIMONY(X) given x)
[P(x) X P(TESTIMONY(X) given x)] + [(1 - P(x)) X P(TESTIMONY(X) given NOT-X)]
Dividing both numerator and denominator by P(x) X P(TESTMONY(X) given x) transforms this
equation to
P(x given TESTIMONY(X)) =  1
I X P(TESTIMONY(X) given NOT-X)
P(TESTIMONY(X) given x) 0(x)
(N4)
where 0(x) is the odds of x, or P(x) - [1 - P(x)]. From this equation it is clear that, for a given
value of P(TESTIMONY(X) given x), the value of P(x given TESTIMONY(X)) depends on the ratio of
two quantities likely to be very small; if O(x) is very small in comparison with P(TESTIMONY(X)
given NOT-X), then P (x given TESTIMONY(X)) will be close to zero, whereas if P(TEsTIMONY(X)
given NOT-X) is very small in comparison with 0(x), then P(x given TESTIMONY(X)) will be close to
one.
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confusion in the literature:42 Suppose that each of the numbers from I to
10,000 is placed on a separate lottery ticket and that Whitney, whom we
believe to be trustworthy, selects one of the tickets at random. Whitney
declares that she has picked ticket 297. P(x 297 ), representing the
probability gauged before Whitney's declaration that ticket 297 would be
chosen, equals 0.0001 (or 1 in 10,000). Given such a tiny prior
probability, do we have confidence, or even perceive a substantial
probability, that Whitney is telling the truth? Can we really say that the
probability that Whitney would announce an incorrect ticket, whether by
design or mistake, is very small? What if there were a million tickets?
Professors Brilmayer and Kornhauser contend that, if the prior
probability of selecting a given ticket is taken into account, as Bayesian
logic demands, "the probability of the witness' veracity becomes exceed-
ingly small as the number of tickets in the lottery is increased."4 This
conclusion, of course, is intuitively incorrect; if we have confidence in the
selector beforehand, we generally rely on her veracity and assume that the
ticket she announces is the one she picked. Accordingly, the Bayesian per-
spective appears flawed.
The solution to this apparent conundrum is really quite straightfor-
ward, and perfectly consistent with Bayesian analysis; it depends on the
realization that, if the selector makes an inaccurate announcement, there
are many possibilities as to what announcement she will make, and the
probability that she will make an inaccurate announcement of ticket 297
is very small. Furthermore, this small probability is virtually identical to,
and so essentially balances out, the small prior probability that ticket 297
was in fact the one chosen. This balance leaves as the crucial factor the
probability that, if ticket 297 is chosen, Whitney will accurately report
that fact. And assuming that Whitney has no reason to deny the truth, the
latter probability is very high. I present a fuller analysis of this problem
in Appendix D.
42. The problem is taken from I. TODHUNTER, A HISTORY OF THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY
OF PROBABILITY FROM THE TIME OF PASCAL TO THAT OF LAPLACE 400 (1865), quoted in
Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 4, at 148 n.114.
43. Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 4, at 148 n.114. As the number of lottery tickets in-
creases, the probability that any one of them will be chosen decreases; hence, if x is the proposition
that ticket 297 is chosen, P(x) decreases as the number of tickets increases. Accordingly, by Bayes'
Theorem, which provides that
P(X) X P(TESTIMONY(X) given x)
P(x given TESTIMONY(X))= P, (N5)P(TESTIMONY(X))
it may appear that "the probability of the witness' veracity"-represented by P(x given TESTI-
MONY(X))-"becomes exceedingly small as the number of tickets in the lottery is increased." But this
argument overlooks a crucial point made in the following paragraph of text and in Appendix D-that
as the number of tickets is increased P(TESTIMONY(X)) also becomes very small.
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The lottery situation is similar to the one posed in the deathbed warn-
ing of one of Damon Runyon's gamblers:
[S]ome day you will come upon a man who will lay down in front of
you a new deck of cards with the seal unbroken and offer to bet he
can make the jack of spades jump out of the deck and squirt cider in
your ear. Son. . . do not bet him because just as sure as you do, you
are going to get an earful of cider.""
The old gambler, who presumably understood both probabilities and
human nature, may have exaggerated somewhat, but he had a point.
First, he understood the temptation of the bet: The prior probability, as-
sessed before the stranger's statement, of an acrobatic and expectorant jack
of spades must be very low. Further, the old man understood the danger:
Also low-and in his view lower by far than the first probability-is the
probability that, if indeed the jack could not perform the particular trick
promised, the stranger would come up with such a claim and put money
on it.45 And if that probability is low enough, then a statement of what
appeared beforehand to be a bizarre proposition may be quite persuasive
evidence.
D. The Elements of Testimonial Failure
We have seen that often there are many inaccurate statements that a
witness may make. Now let us focus on how it may happen that the wit-
ness fails to testify accurately.
It is customary to speak of four testimonial capacities, generally re-
ferred to by such labels as perception, memory, sincerity, and articulate-
ness. 6 Accurate testimony depends on the satisfactory operation of all four
capacities. In route analysis terms, this means that for events to go from a
fact x to accurate testimony of x by a witness, they must first go from x
to PERCEIVE(X) (the witness perceived x), then to BELIEVE(X) (the witness
44. This advice, perhaps most familiar from the musical Guys and Dolls, was recently repeated in
I. BFwKow, RED: A BIOGRAPHY OF RED SMITH 33 (1986).
45. In the lottery case, the probability that the witness would assert the proposition notwithstand-
ing its falsity is low because she is unlikely to select the particular number, even assuming that she
made an inaccurate announcement. In the gambler's case, the corresponding probability is low be-
cause the stranger is unlikely to concoct the particular bizarre phenomenon, and unlikely to make a
bluff that costs him money if called and gains him nothing if not called.
46. The exact terminology differs from one catalogue to another. Compare Park, supra note 40,
at 425 n.7 with Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REV.
741, 744-45 (1961) and Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62
HARV. L. REV. 177, 178-79, 185-88 (1948). I prefer "articulateness" or "communication," to the
more commonly used "narration," see 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 478, at 636-37 & n.1 (.
Chadbourn rev. 1979), which is too narrow a term. See Maguire, supra, at 745 n.10 (also rejecting
"narration").
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remembered, and so now believes, x), then to INTEND(X) (the witness sin-
cerely intends to declare x), and only then to TESTIMONY(X) (the witness
testifies articulately to x). At any point events might depart from this
main route, which we will call the "truth path" to TESTIMONY(X). The
witness might, for example, sincerely intend to testify to x, but because of
his inability to use the language, articulate a conflicting proposition
instead.
Our main concern now, though, is not with how events might depart
from the truth path to TESTIMONY(X) if x is true. If we hear a witness'
testimony of x, we do not know that x is true, but we do know that events
have reached TESTIMONY(X). Our concern, therefore, is to determine by
which paths, in addition to the truth path leading through x, events might
have proceeded from 0 to TESTIMONY(X).
Figure 6 displays the problem, showing the truth path and other paths
to the TESTIMONY node. This diagram can be used in a wide variety of
cases by letting x stand for the material proposition to which a witness
has testified. Suppose that, as in the classic case of Wright v. Tatham,
47
the will of one Marsden is challenged. The material proposition in dis-
pute, MARSOUND, is that Marsden was mentally sound when he wrote the
will, and TESTIMONY(MARSOUND) represents the undisputed proposition
that a Mr. Ellershaw has made an assertion understood to be of MAR-
SOUND. How did events proceed to that declaration? If we let x stand for
MARSOUND in Figure 6, that diagram indicates five possible routes. One,
the truth path, passes through MARSOUND: Marsden is indeed of sound
mind, a fact that Ellershaw has perceived and remembered, wishes to
communicate, and does communicate articulately. The other paths pass
through NOT-MARSOUND-indicating that Marsden is not of sound
mind-and then join the truth path at one point or another.
In one of these paths (from NOT-MARSOUND through PER-
CEIVE(MARSOUND) to TESTIMONY(MARSOUND)), Ellershaw has mis-
perceived Marsden's mental condition. In another (from NOT-MARSOUND
via the NOT-PERCEIVE(MARSOUND)-BELIEVE(MARSOUND) link to TESTI-
MONY(MARSOUND)), Ellershaw has correctly perceived the defect, but has
forgotten it by the time of his declaration.48 In a third (the route
47. 7 Eng. Rep. 559 (H.L. 1838), aiffg Wright v. Doe d. Tatham, 112 Eng. Rep. 448 (Ex. Ch.
1837). The hypothetical facts presented here differ from those of the actual case, in which Ellershaw
did not testify, and had not made any explicit assertion regarding Marsden's mental state. See infra
Section III.B.3. (variations on Wright).
48. References to a mental defect may be oversimplifications, made here because Figure 6 indi-
cates only two possibilities at each step of the testimonial process. The negation of mental soundness
need not be regarded as monolithic; there are many varieties and degrees of mental defect. On this
view, the statement in the text should be rephrased: Whether Ellershaw has correctly perceived the
defect or not, he has not made the particular misperception of perceiving mental soundness, but he has
made the particular error of remembering mental soundness, thus joining the truth path leading from
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through the NOT-BELIEVE(MARSOUND)-INTEND(MARSOUND) link), Eller-
shaw correctly remembers Marsden's mental unsoundness but lies about
it. In the fourth (from NOT-MARSOUND through all the lower nodes and
finally from NOT-INTEND(MARSOUND) to TESTIMONY(MARSOUND)), El-
lershaw does not wish to speak inaccurately, but does so because of his
own inability with the language. He might, for instance, have wanted to
convey the information that Marsden has a vivid imagination and vocabu-
lary-a fact certainly consistent with Marsden's (hypothetically) unsound
mind-but confused "lurid" with "lucid."
Figure 6 is a generalized and broadly applicable diagram. A diagram
this simple does not, however, represent all the routes to a declaration; to
do so would render it too complex to be useful. The simplifications are of
two sorts: Some important linkages are not shown at all, and others are
presented in the aggregate.
(1) Linkages not shown. Figure 6 does not present certain linkages that
are so unlikely that they may be ignored. In particular, it does not portray
the possibility of compensating error. It is conceivable, for example, where
the question is how many balls there were in an urn and William testifies
that there were 10, that there were indeed 10 and that William perceived
20 but now remembers 10. Conceivable but, in the elegant phrasing of
Eliza Doolittle, "[n]ot bloody likely";"" it would be rather flukish, in a
question involving quantification, for the two errors to cancel each other
out exactly. At least with respect to such a question, we generally may
"[n]eglect[] the very small possibility of compensating error. "50
In other circumstances, however, compensating error may be a more
substantial possibility. Suppose, for example, that William identifies Den-
nis, whose aquiline nose he says he recognizes, as the man he saw fleeing
a bank after robbing it. It is perfectly plausible that Dennis was indeed
the robber, that William had such a fleeting view of him that he did not
in fact notice the nose, but that he now believes-after the subtle sugges-
tivity of police interrogation, a view of mugshots, and a lineup-that he
did. In other words, his declaration could be the product of compensating
errors of perception and memory. For a route diagram of such a case to be
most useful, it should indicate the possibility of a path leading through x,
then down to NOT-PERCEIVE(X), and then back up through BELIEVE(X).
(2) Aggregated linkages. Figure 6 not only ignores some linkages; it
also merges some that are conceptually distinct. Consider, for example, the
MARSOUND to TESTIMONY(MARSOUND). In this case, however, we are primarily interested in the
simple binary issue of soundness versus unsoundness, so the simplification probably does not distort
our analysis. See generally infra text accompanying note 51.
49. G. SHAW, Pygmalion, in BERNARD SHAW: SELECTED PLAys 561 (1981).
50. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1088.
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possibility of failed memory. This might have occurred at any time be-
tween the perception and the declaration. The declarant's state of mind at
any time in that interval may be represented as a point on the PER-
CEIVE(X)-BELIEVE(X) link or the NOT-PERCEIVE(X)-NOT-BELIEVE(X)
link. The various possibilities of failed memory could then be represented
by an infinite series of arrows leading from points on the NOT-
PERCEIVE(X)-NOT-BELIEVE(X) link to points farther right on the PER-
CEIVE(X)-BELIEVE(X) link. Unless it is important to focus on the precise
time of a possible memory failure, it will suffice to summarize all these
possibilities by the single arrow from NOT-PERCEIVE(X) to BELIEVE(X).
Perhaps more significantly, Figure 6 does not fully reflect the point
made in the last subsection, that the possibilities of testimonial error are
often multiple. That multiplicity applies not only to the testimony as a
whole, but also to each of the testimonial capacities. For example, if there
are 10 balls in an urn, it is a simplification to say that a witness may
either perceive 10 balls or perceive that there are not exactly 10 balls;
obviously, the second alternative compounds an infinite number of incor-
rect perceptions. Of necessity, Figure 6 adopts this simplification, using
each NOT node to represent myriad possibilities. Because of this com-
pounding, the link from one NOT node to another does not always re-
present merely the probability that a given testimonial capacity operates
correctly, albeit on an incorrect premise. The case of memory is again a
good illustration. The link between NOT-PERCEIVE(X) and NOT-
BELIEVE(X) represents the probability that the witness will avoid the par-
ticular error of remembering x even though he has not perceived x. That
is, the link represents the probability, given the witness' perception, of an
accurate memory or of all possible inaccuracies but that one. Because Fig-
ure 6 focuses on proposition x, it does not distinguish the witness who
perceives and remembers Y from another witness who perceives Y but re-
members z.
Thus, Figure 6 simplifies reality by failing to show that an erroneous
statement may be the product of compound failure of more than one testi-
monial capacity. The witness may perceive 20 balls, remember 40 balls,
intend to testify to 60 balls, but mistakenly communicate that there were
80 balls. The occurrence of such non-compensating multiple errors is en-
tirely possible, and where necessary could be indicated by adding extra
nodes. It may, however, often be put aside, especially when the question
confronting the witness is conceived in yes-or-no terms.
Figure 6, in short, is a model of a credibility problem. Like all models,
it simplifies reality, making the problem more tractable at the price of
obscuring some complexity. But, like good models, it also is flexible, al-
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lowing the presentation of more complexity when satisfactory analysis re-
quires it.
However complex a particular diagram may be, the key point is that
there are numerous paths, in addition to the truth path, leading to a testi-
monial statement. Once these paths are discerned, it is a straightforward
matter to determine the probability, given the statement, that the proposi-
tion the statement asserts is true. That determination requires a compari-
son of (1) the a priori probability that events would lead to the statement
via the truth path (or, if compensating errors are plausible, any other path
leading through both the proposition and the statement) with (2) the a
priori probability, summed for all possible routes, that events would pro-
duce the statement.51
The prior probability of the proposition's truth is critical to this deter-
mination, as are the individual probabilities that a given testimonial fail-
ure would lead events to the statement notwithstanding its falsehood. A
route diagram can set out the principal possibilities and enable us to de-
termine their likelihoods. As those who have previously considered the du-
bious mental health of Mr. Marsden might guess, and as Section III will
show, this method can be extended usefully to analyze problems of
hearsay.
III. ROUTE ANALYSIS OF HEARSAY
This Section applies route analysis to some basic issues of hearsay doc-
trine. The standard approach, entrenched by the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, defines and presumptively excludes a category of evidence as hear-
say; it then defines and excepts from this exclusionary rule various
subcategories of evidence, against which the concerns underlying the basic
rule are thought not usually to apply in full force. The following pages
will take up this doctrine on its own terms, using route analysis to show
ways in which the definitional approach achieves its purpose and other
ways in which it falls short.
My aim here is principally methodological; I do not seek to demonstrate
51. Thus, by Bayesian logic a fraction may represent the probability, given the statement, that the
proposition it asserts is true. For the simple general case represented by Figure 6, the numerator of
this fraction is the a priori probability that events would lead to the statement via the truth path, or
P(x) X P(PERCEIVE(X) given X) X P(BELIEVE(X) given PERCEIVE(X)) X
P(INTEND(X) given BELIEVE(X)) X P(TESTIMONY(X) given INTEND(X)).
The denominator of this fraction is the a priori probability that events would lead to the statement
via any path. In addition to the truth path, there are four paths to the statement-one for each of the
testimonial incapacities-in the simple general case represented by Figure 6. Thus, the denominator
is:
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that, as others have argued,52 the doctrine should be abolished, replaced,
or drastically reformed. Having disclaimed this motive, I must add that I
hope the analysis presented here lends force to some of these arguments,
simply by fostering a better understanding of hearsay-for to understand
traditional hearsay doctrine is to appreciate the legal insight of Mr. Bum-
ble.83 The rigid definitional approach does not work well; it bars many
items of evidence that do not raise substantial hearsay concerns and ad-
mits others that do. Under a more sensitive approach, the judge would
decide whether the particular item of evidence has enough probative value
to justify admissibility, notwithstanding the hearsay concerns that it raises
and any possibility that excluding it would induce the production of other
evidence not raising those concerns. This approach depends on case-by-
case analysis rather than on broad categorizations.54 Thus, although this
P(X) X P(PERCEIVE(X) given x) X P(BELIEVE(X) given PERCEIVE(X)) X
P(INTEND(X) given BELIEVE(X)) X P(TESTIMONY(X) given INTEND(X))
[truth path]
plus
P(NOT-X) X P(PERCEIVE(X) given NOT-X) X P(BELIEVE(X) given PERCEIVE(X)) X
P(INTEND(X) given BELIEVE(X)) X P(TESTIMONY(X) given INTEND(X))
[path of failure of perception]
plus
P(NOT-X) X P(NOT-PERCEIVE(X) given NOT-X) X P(BELIEVE(X) given NOT-
PERCEIVE(X)) X P(INTEND(X) given BELIEVE(X)) X P(TESTIMONY(X) given
INTEND(X))
[path of failure of memory]
plus
P(NOT-X) X P(NOT-PERCEIVE(X) given NOT-X) X P(NOT-BELIEVE(X) given NOT-
PERCEIVE(X)) X P(INTEND(X) given NOT-BELIEVE(X)) X P(TESTIMONY(X) given
INTEND(X))
[path of failure of sincerity]
plus
P(NOT-X) X P(NOT-PERCEIVE(X) given NOT-X) X P(NOT-BELIEVE(X) given NOT-
PERCEIVE(X)) X P(NOT-INTEND(X) given NOT-BELIEVE(X)) X P(TESTIMONY(X)
given NOT-INTEND(X)).
[path of failure of articulateness]
(N7)
52. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rules 501-531 (1942); Weinstein, Probative Force of Hear-
say, 46 IowA L. REv. 331 (1961); Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1786 (1980); Comment, Abolish the Rule Against Hearsay, 35 U. Prrr. L. REv. 609
(1974); see also English Civil Evidence Act, 1968, ch. 64 (relaxing barriers to admitting hearsay
evidence).
53. "'If the law supposes that,' said Mr. Bumble. .. 'the law is a ass, a idiot.'" C. DICKENS,
OLIVER TwIsr ch. 51 (1837-38).
54. Such a flexible approach may not appear to give sure enough protection to a criminal defend-
ant's constitutional right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. But I believe that confronta-
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Section contends that particular types of evidence should or should not be
considered hearsay, these comments are made only in the context of the
prevailing definitional approach, which I regard as wholly unsatisfactory.
A. A Basic Hearsay Question: Is the Assertion Offered for Its Truth?
When a hearsay declaration is offered into evidence, the jury must rely
on testimony to determine that the declaration was made by the person
and under the circumstances claimed. Even if the jury sees a written hear-
say statement, ordinarily it still must depend on a witness' testimony that
the writing is what the proponent of the evidence claims it to be. In this
respect, however, hearsay is no different from other types of evidence. Ju-
ries must rely on testimony, rather than, or in addition to, their own sense
impressions, to determine all sorts of facts; there is no reason why they
cannot conclude, on the basis of testimony, that a statement was made,
who made it, and under what circumstances.
Hearsay is perceived as troublesome for a different reason: Because the
declaration was made out of court rather than before the jury and subject
to cross-examination,55 the jury may have inadequate means of determin-
ing whether that declaration was true. Thus, the basic definition of hear-
say includes not all out-of-court declarations, but only those offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.56
Figure 7 illustrates this point. TESTXMONY(DECLARATION(X)) repre-
sents the fact, known to the jury through its own senses, that a witness
has testified to the proposition DECLARATION(X)-that an out-of-court de-
clarant has made a declaration of proposition x. The jury does not know
from its own senses whether that testimony is accurate; hence, the dia-
gram shows both the DECLARATION(X) and the NOT-DECLARATION(X)
nodes. In turn, the jury does not know how, if DECLARATION(X) is true,
events proceeded to that point-by the truth path through x or through
NOT-X. The perceived difficulty in making that determination without ob-
serving the declaration and cross-examination of it underlies the hearsay
tion is a matter very distinct from hearsay. Whereas the hearsay rules are intended to guarantee the
truth-finding capacity of the system, confrontation doctrine should protect the system's sense and ap-
pearance of fairness. Somewhat tentatively, I suggest that the confrontation clause be construed to give
a criminal defendant an absolute right against admissibility of an accusation unless the defendant has
an opportunity to cross-examine the accuser. By comparison to the hearsay rule, which is very exten-
sive-potentially applying to virtually any assertion-but riddled with exceptions, the confrontation
right should be far narrower-applying only to accusations-but far more intensive. I am currently
engaged in revision of the hearsay portion of the Wigmore treatise, in which I hope to develop this
approach to hearsay and confrontation.
55. In some cases, an out-of-court declaration will be admitted notwithstanding the hearsay rule
because the declarant is a witness subject to cross-examination. See FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(1). The
extent to which such later availability alleviates the hearsay concern continues to be a matter of
dispute. See, e.g., R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELREID & E. KIONKA, supra note 5, at 432-35.
56. FED. R. EvID. 801(c).
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rule. But this difficulty does not arise if the material issue is simply
whether the declaration was made or not-i.e., if the issue is whether







Take the case in which a woman sues a grocery store for injuries alleg-
edly suffered in a fall caused by the store's negligently leaving spilled
ketchup spread over the floor. 7 Let SPILL represent the proposition that
there was indeed ketchup on the floor, and suppose the plaintiff offers the
testimony of another shopper that a third one told a fourth at the checkout
counter, "A ketchup bottle spilled all over the floor." Here the testimony
is being offered to prove that SPILL is true. In order to conclude that, the
jury must decide not only that DECLARATION(SPILL) is true-that the wit-
ness before it, Shopper Two, is telling the truth about what he
heard-but also that events reached that point via SPILL rather than
through NOT-SPILL.
As we already know from Section II.D., there may be more than one
path leading through NOT-SPILL to the node representing a declaration of
SPILL. To show these paths, we need a map more detailed than Figure 7.
Figure 8, which has the same format as Figure 6 but with an extra col-
umn of nodes, is such a map. Figure 8 shows in detail the route between
57. This hypothetical is an altered version of Safeway Stores v. Combs, 273 F.2d 295 (5th Cir.
1960). The variation later in the text, see infra text following note 58, is closer to the actual facts of
Safeway, which properly held the evidence at issue admissible.
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SPILL and DECLARATION(SPILL) and also shows each of the principal
routes through NOT-SPILL to DECLARATION(SPILL). 58 The diagram also
shows that the evidence before the jury is not Shopper Three's declaration
of SPILL but Shopper Two's testimony of that declaration. We could, if we
wished, show a whole set of nodes between the DECLARATION(SPILL) col-
umn and TESTIMONY(DECLARATION(SPILL))-nodes representing PER-
CEIVE(DECLARATION(SPILL)), BELIEVE(DECLARATION(SPILL)), INTEND
(DECLARATION(SPILL)), and their negations-similar to those diagrammed
in Figure 8, to emphasize the problems in inferring from testimony that a
given out-of-court declaration was made. That is not our principal con-
cern in analyzing hearsay, however, so the full array of linkages and
nodes is not shown. Indeed, to sharpen the focus on the hearsay issue,
suppose that the jury completely trusts Shopper Two, and so concludes
that DECLARATION(SPILL) is true. To be confident, however, that events
reached DECLARATION(SPILL) via SPILL rather than through NOT-SPILL,
the jury must be sure that events could not have passed through NOT-
SPILL and then joined the truth path by taking one of the routes indicating
a failed testimonial capacity of Shopper Three. Hearsay doctrine holds
that the jury cannot be sufficiently sure of this, because Shopper Three's
statement was not made in court and subject to cross-examination.
But now suppose that the intended recipient of Shopper Three's warn-
ing was not a fourth shopper but the plaintiff herself, and that it is the
defendant who offers the evidence. Plainly, the store has no desire to prove
SPILL, and it may even deny that proposition. But here DECLARA-
TION(SPILL)-the proposition that the declaration was made-is itself rel-
evant. It tends to prove that, whether or not SPILL was actually true, the
plaintiff was on notice that it might be true. To conclude DECLARA-
TION(SPILL) does not require the jury to follow the route diagram all the
way back to SPILL or NOT-SPILL. So far as this use of the testimony is
concerned, there is no need for the jury to distinguish among the routes
leading to DECLARATION(SPILL). Even if that point was reached through a
failure of Shopper Three's perception or memory, the fact remains that
she made the declaration. The hearsay doctrine will not bar use of Shop-
58. Diagrams drawn especially for specific cases may be more or less complex than the general
one. In some contexts, certain nodes shown by Figure 8 may be extraneous. Indeed, if we can put
aside doubts as to whether the declaration was in fact made, a simpler diagram, in the form of Figure
6, can often be used. See, e.g., infra Figure 15; see also infra note 77 and accompanying text, text
accompanying notes 99-100 & note 100 (congruence of nodes).
On the other hand, Figure 8 does not show any of the paths linking SPILL and NOT-
DECLARATION(SPILL), because ordinarily we may disregard as de minimis the probability that (1)
SPILL is true, (2) the declarant for some reason did not declare spiLL, and yet (3) the in-court witness
testifies that he did so declare. This is not always true, however. Where necessary, these paths, each of
which includes a link leading from the truth path to the lower row of nodes, may be diagrammed.
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per Two's testimony to prove the fact of, as opposed to the truth of, that
declaration.
Thus, the route diagram helps explain why hearsay doctrine bars proof
of an out-of-court declaration only when it is offered for its truth, and not
when it has some other relevance, such as proving notice. To be precise,
we must recognize that proving that a declaration such as DECLARA-
TION(SPILL) was made is not equivalent to proving that the plaintiff was
on notice. It may be that she failed to hear or understand the warning.
Figure 9 helps show this, for a slightly altered case. Here Shopper
Three's testimony is that Shopper Two declared BROKE, the proposition
that a ketchup bottle broke on the shelf. WARNED represents the proposi-
tion that the plaintiff received and understood the message as a warning.
Figure 9 is what I call a two-excursion map. It indicates no direct rela-
tionship between TESTIMONY(DECLARATION(BROKE)) and WARNED; cer-
tainly, later testimony of a declaration of BROKE could not cause a warn-
ing to be received at the time of the alleged spillage, and we may posit
that neither does receipt of the warning make the later testimony more
probable. Thus, Figure 9 shows no direct links between TESTI-
MONY(DECLARATION(BROKE)) or its negation and WARNED or its nega-
tion. This does not mean that the two issues are irrelevant to each other,
however. Both are related to the issue of whether DECLARATION(BROKE)
is true. First, the truth of DECLARATION(BROKE) makes it more likely that
Shopper Two will later testify that the declaration was made. This rela-
tion is indicated by a set of single arrows similar to those in Figure 8.
Second, if DECLARATION(BROKE) is true, the probability that the shopper
who fell had received a warning increases as well. A set of double arrows
portrays this second relation.59
TESTIMONY(DECLARATION(BROKE)) may therefore help prove WARNED
by increasing the probability of DECLARATION(BROKE), which in turn in-
creases the probability of WARNED. As Figure 9 shows, this logic does not
require tracing the routes back to BROKE or NOT-BROKE; the jury need
look no farther left than DECLARATION(BROKE). But the testimony does
require the jury to determine whether events in fact proceeded from DEC-
LARATION(BROKE) to WARNED. Such a determination may be largely
speculative, for it requires the jury to assess the plaintiff's perceptive abil-
ity and how well that ability operated in the particular case. Nevertheless,
a court would almost certainly allow the jury to infer WARNED from TES-
TIMONY(DECLARATION(BROKE)) even absent testimony by the plaintiff as
to whether she received and understood the warning. The danger in draw-
59. For a further discussion of two-excursion maps, see A Diagrammatic Approach, supra note 1,
at 605-11.
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ing such an inference may be substantial, and it is similar to the hearsay
danger in that the jury is making a determination of the capacity and
mental performance of someone not before it. But, because the jury is not
called on to trace the links back from DECLARATION(BROKE) to BROKE or
NOT-BROKE, the hearsay rule-anomalously, perhaps-never comes into
play.
Figure 9 can also represent a case in which, although the material issue
and the proposition asserted in the declaration are not the same, one party
does in effect ask the jury to trace links back to the nodes representing the
assertion's truth, and on from there to the material proposition. Suppose
now that Shopper Two is prepared to testify that Shopper Three declared
BROKE to him out of the plaintiff's earshot, and that the plaintiff offers
this to prove SPILL. In arguing for admissibility of the evidence, plaintiff's
counsel may contend (though probably in different phrasing): "The issue
here is not BROKE or NOT-BROKE. The issue is SPILL or NOT-SPILL, where
SPILL represents the proposition that ketchup was spilled on the floor.
Proof of DECLARATION(BROKE) is good circumstantial evidence because
SPILL is more probably true given that Shopper Three declared BROKE."
The judge should sustain the hearsay objection, ruling in essence: "The
only reason that DECLARATION(BROKE) increases the probability of SPILL
is that it increases the probability of BROKE, and P(SPILL given BROKE) is
greater than P(SPILL given NOT-BROKE). But the jury cannot infer BROKE
from DECLARATION(BROKE), whether as an intermediate or ultimate ob-
jective, without making the forbidden hearsay determination of whether
events could plausibly have reached DECLARATION(BROKE) from NOT-
BROKE." So in this case, the fact that the material issue is the truth of
SPILL, rather than of the asserted proposition BROKE, will not avail
against a hearsay objection. 0
It is possible at this point to discern several advantages that route dia-
grams offer over the so-called testimonial triangle. The triangle has three
nodes: one in the lower left representing the out-of-court declaration or
conduct, one at the apex representing the declarant's belief, and one in the
lower right representing the proposition for which the declaration is of-
fered.61 The value of the triangle appears undeniable, for many scholars
find it helpful in understanding hearsay doctrine. Nevertheless, as com-
pared to the triangle, route analysis offers several significant benefits. For
example:
(1) A route diagram, unlike the triangle, can show that the evidence
before the jury is not an out-of-court declaration (DECLARATION(X)) but
60. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 17, § 246, at 729-30; Park, supra note 40, at
429.
61. See Tribe, supra note 5, at 959.
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testimony that the declaration was made (TESTIMONY(DECLARATION(X))).
Thus, a route diagram such as Figures 7, 8, or 9 can, where appropriate,
indicate doubt as to whether the declaration was made; TESTI-
MONY(DECLARATION(X)) might have been reached through NOT-
DECLARATION(X) as well as through DECLARATION(X).
(2) A route diagram represents as separate points a declaration, DECLA-
RATION(X), and the material proposition x that the declaration asserts.
Whether TESTIMONY(DECLARATION(X)) is hearsay generally depends on
which proposition it is offered to prove; to conclude DECLARATION(X), the
factfinder must reject the possible routes leading through NOT-
DECLARATION(X), whereas to conclude x, which is more distant from the
testimony node, the factfinder must additionally reject the routes that lead
from NOT-X to DECLARATION(X) and so raise hearsay problems.
In contrast, no matter what the relationship between the declaration
and the conclusion for which it is offered, the triangle represents them
across the base from each other. This suggests that the difference between
a hearsay inference and a nonhearsay inference is that the latter repre-
sents a shortcut to the same point-along the base of the triangle rather
than by the long route up to the apex (representing belief) and then down
again. The better explanation, as shown by route diagrams, is that DEC-
LARATION(X) is more closely related to TESTIMONY(DECLARATION(X))
than is x, and is in fact a stepping stone between the two.
(3) Route analysis is flexible. For a simple case, a simple diagram such
as Figure 7 may suffice. When it is necessary to separate out more pre-
cisely the possible paths to a declaration, a somewhat more detailed map
such as Figure 8 can be developed. And if the relation between the decla-
ration and the material proposition is like that of DECLARATION(BROKE)
to WARNED, or like the much more attenuated relation of DECLARA-
TION(BROKE) to SPILL, it may be shown in a diagram like Figure 9. Thus,
a route diagram may be custom-made to fit the particulars of the case at
hand. We shall see further examples of such tailoring, an adaptability that
the triangle does not offer.
(4) A route diagram shows not only routes indicating that the material
proposition is true but also routes indicating that it is not. Thus, the dia-
gram presents each testimonial incapacity as a separate link; in determin-
ing the possible routes that might have led to a declaration, we can assess
whether there is a significant probability that the declaration was reached
via the link representing a particular incapacity.
In part, this determination depends on empirical observation. For ex-
ample, the hearsay exception under Rule 803(2) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence for excited utterances is based on the hypothesis that, because
the startling condition leaves little opportunity for conscious fabrication,
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the NOT-BELIEVE(X)-INTEND(X) link is weak.62 Closer analysis, with the
help of Figure 8, suggests that this premise is rather dubious. (Although
this diagram is drawn with respect to a particular proposition, SPILL, it
may be made applicable to any propositon x simply by substituting x for
SPILL throughout.) True, stress may increase the probability that the de-
clarant will blurt out the truth. But that does not decrease the probability
of the NOT-BELIEVE(X)-INTEND(X) link; rather, it increases the
probability of the BELIEVE(X)-INTEND(X) link. In all likelihood stress will
also increase the probability of the NOT-BELIEVE(X)-INTEND(X) link, be-
cause it will increase the probability that the declarant will blurt out
something, whether true or false. It may very well be, as Appendix E
discusses, that the net effect of stress is to decrease the probability that the
declarant was sincere. Moreover, even assuming that stress does improve
sincerity, the same condition might also strengthen the NOT-
X-PERCEIVE(X), NOT-PERCEIVE(X)-BELIEVE(X), and NOT-
INTEND(X)-DECLARATION(X) links-representing misperception, failed
memory, and inarticulateness-and so increase the probability that DEC-
LARATION(X) was reached via NOT-X.
The testimonial triangle is once again limited in comparison to route
analysis, for it does not foster as precise an analysis of the individual inca-
pacities. For one thing, the triangle represents misperception and failed
memory together on the same leg of the triangle, and insincerity and inar-
ticulateness together on another leg. This structure does not encourage
separate treatment of each incapacity. The triangle does not, for example,
make it as readily apparent as does a route diagram that the same stress
that arguably diminishes sincerity problems may also increase articulate-
ness problems. Second, the triangle does not support close analysis of the
nature of any given hearsay incapacity in the same way that a route dia-
gram does; whereas the triangle represents the sincerity issue simply by
placing it on the right leg, a route diagram forces us to think about the
probability that a declarant would attempt to articulate proposition x if he
believed x to be true and the probability that he would do so even if he
did not believe x to be true.
Route analysis, then, helps us identify and think more clearly about
empirical issues in the law of hearsay, such as whether the assumptions
underlying the excited utterances exception are justified. But, like any
other non-empirical form of analysis, it cannot resolve such matters with-
out the aid of empirical data. There is, however, another type of hearsay
issue that is not so dependent. Sometimes we can say, as a matter of logic
rather than of experience, that because of the relationships between an
62. FED. R. EVID. 803(2) advisory committee's notes.
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out-of-court declaration and the proposition for which it is offered, one or
more of the hearsay dangers is not present. Route diagrams help show
why this is so. Suppose that the link representing an incapacity is on a
path leading to the node representing the material proposition (or another
proposition from which the material proposition can readily be inferred),
rather than on a path leading from the node representing falsity of that
proposition to the declaration. In such a case, the incapacity does not offer
a possible explanation of how the declaration could be made notwith-
standing the falsity of the proposition;63 accordingly, the incapacity does
not raise a hearsay problem.
The remainder of this Section will concentrate on such logically ori-
ented problems. Some of these will concern the definition of hearsay, and
some will concern exceptions to the rule against hearsay. For the most
part, this distinction may be ignored; whether a given statement falls
within an exception or outside the hearsay definition itself is, as we shall
see, often unclear, and it is almost always unimportant.
B. Material Intermediate Points
In the previous subsection, we saw that TESTIMONY(DECLARATION(X))
is regarded as hearsay if offered to prove x, but not if offered to prove
DECLARATION(X). The former case presents all four of the hearsay dan-
gers, and the latter case none of them. But what if the material fact is one
of the points between x and DECLARATION(X)? Then a more discriminat-
ing analysis is necessary, because some, but not all, of the hearsay dangers
may arise.
1. Proof of Belief Concurrent with the Statement and Inferences from
That Belief
BELIEVE(X) is the intermediate point for which TESTI-
MONY(DECLARATION(X)) is most commonly offered. That point represents
63. Indeed, in such a situation, the existence of a path leading through the incapacity link will
tend to increase rather than diminish the probability of the material proposition, because it provides
another course of events, in addition to the one indicating truthful reporting by the declarant, that
includes both the declaration and the material proposition.
For example, suppose a party seeks to prove that Delia believed proposition x by introducing
testimony that Delia made an out-of-court declaration of x. It is of course possible that x is true and
Delia believed x and intended to assert x. But it is also possible that Delia's belief in x is based only
on her faulty perception or memory. Thus, the probability that Delia believed x is (1) the probability
that x is true, and she accurately perceived and remembered it (i.e., the probability of the truth path),
plus (2) the probability that x is not true, but she inaccurately perceived it to be true, and then
remembered it, plus (3) the probability that x is not true, and she did not perceive it to be true, but
she did remember it as being true. In this case, misperception and misremembering-which we nor-
mally think of as hearsay dangers-increase the probability that the proposition being supported
(Delia's belief) is true. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
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the proposition that the out-of-court declarant believed x at the time of his
declaration-that is, his memory told him at the time of his statement that
x is true, whether x or NOT-X was in fact true, and whether he perceived
x or not.
Take as an example testimony that, shortly before killing the marshal,
Knapp64 asserted proposition CLUB, "The marshal clubbed an old man to
death." If offered to prove the clubbing, the testimony is plainly hear-
say-perhaps, indeed, hearsay within hearsay. 5 But the defense can offer
the testimony for a more limited purpose, to show BELIEVE(CLUB)-that
when Knapp made the declaration he believed it to be true. From BE-
LIEVE(CLUB) the jury might infer the proposition represented in Figure 10
as FEAR, that Knapp feared the marshal.
If the hearsay rule does not block use of testimony of DECLARA-
TION(CLUB) to prove BELIEVE(CLUB), then it will not prevent the jury
from making the further inference of FEAR from BELIEVE(CLUB). This is
analogous to the principle that hearsay doctrine, having allowed the jury
to infer DECLARATION(BROKE) from testimony of the declaration, also al-
lows an inference of WARNED from DECLARATION(BROKE). 6 8 The ques-
tion thus is whether the doctrine allows use of the testimony to prove
BELIEVE(CLUB).
Events might have reached BELIEVE(CLUB) through CLUB and PER-
CEIVE(CLUB) (the truth path), through NOT-CLUB and PERCEIVE(CLUB)
(misperception), or through NOT-CLUB and NOT-PERCEIVE(CLUB) (bad
memory). Since BELIEVE(CLUB) rather than CLUB is the factual proposi-
tion at issue, it does not matter if BELIEVE(CLUB) has been reached
64. See supra Section II.B.
65. The general rule is that testimony of a hearsay declaration can be admitted only if it fits
within an exception to the hearsay rule and if the declaration itself would be admissible if delivered
as in-court testimony. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 402 (evidence not admissible if not relevant); FED. R.
EVID. 805 (hearsay within hearsay not excluded as hearsay if each statement fits within an excep-
tion); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 17, §§ 285, 300, 310 (application of usual rules of
evidence to various hearsay declarations). But see id. § 263 (majority of decisions hold requirement of
first-hand knowledge not applicable to admissions). Because in this variation Knapp asserted that the
clubbing had occurred, and not merely that he had learned of it from another source, it might not be
technically correct to bar that assertion, if offered by him from the witness stand, as hearsay; rather,
because Knapp did not witness the clubbing, and so lacked personal knowledge of it, the better objec-
tion to such testimony would be that it was incompetent. Id. § 247; see id. § 300, at 865 ("[tlhe usual
requirement for witnesses and also for hearsay declarants since they in reality are witnesses, [is] that
they must have had firsthand knowledge of the facts . . . ." (footnotes omitted)).
I shall not further discuss problems of hearsay within hearsay. They can be diagrammed in a
straightforward manner by replacing TESTIMONY(DECLARATION(X)) by a node labeled DECLARA-
TION(DECLARATION(X)), under which is a node labeled NOT-DECLARATION(DECLARATION(X)). A se-
ries of nodes similar to that with which we are now familiar leads to the node representing the actual
in-court testimony, TESIMONY(DECLARATION(DECLARATION(X))).
66. See supra Figure 9 and accompanying text.
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through misperception or faulty memory, and so those possible incapaci-
ties pose no hearsay danger.
67
The same cannot be said for the incapacities represented to the right of
BELIEVE(CLUB). Even if the jurors are confident from the in-court testi-
mony that Knapp made the declaration, they cannot conclude that he be-
lieved in it unless they regard as improbable the possibilities that he was
insincere or inarticulate.6 It cannot, however, be said a priori that those
possibilities are insubstantial-Knapp may have spoken figuratively, or
with crafty self-interest in anticipation of a murder and a plea of self-
defense. Nevertheless, a court would almost certainly hold that, because
the testimony of Knapp's declaration is being offered to show his belief
rather than the truth of his assertion, the hearsay bar does not apply. In
effect, elimination of two of the hearsay dangers, misperception and faulty
memory, is enough to remove the bar.
Suppose now that Knapp began his statement with an assertion of be-
lief: "I believe that the marshal clubbed an old man to death." If the
statement is offered, as before, to prove Knapp's belief, should it be ex-
cluded as hearsay because it is quite literally being offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted? Our intuition tells us that it should not,
because virtually every declaration of fact could be considered implicitly to
assert a belief, and making the assertion of belief explicit does not alter
the substance of the factual declaration. We can make this intuition more
precise with the help of Figure 11. This diagram is similar to Figure 10,
but without the FEAR and NOT-FEAR nodes, and with two other differ-
ences. For simplicity, it reflects the assumption that Knapp did indeed
make the out-of-court declaration; because DECLARATION(CLUB) is as-
sumed to be true, there is no need to show the TESTi-
MONY(DECLARATION(CLUB)) and NOT-DECLARATION(CLUB) nodes. More
significantly, because Knapp's declaration was of his belief rather than of
the underlying facts-i.e., of BELIEVE(CLUB) rather than of CLUB-in this
67. This does not mean that there would be no advantage to examining Knapp to determine
P(PERCEIVE(CLUB) given NOT-CLUB) or P(BELIEVE(CLUB) given NOT-CLUB & NOT-PERCEIVE(CLUB)).
Knowing them would help determine the probability of the material proposition BELIEVE(CLUB). But
these possibilities pose no hearsay danger because they add to, rather than subtract from, the total
probability of BELIEVE(CLUB), by providing additional paths by which events may have passed
through BELIEVE(CLUB); when the declarant's belief, rather than the underlying fact, is at issue, the
possibility that he misperceived or misremembered the fact increases, not decreases, the probability
that his belief was in accordance with his declaration. See supra note 63.
68. It is not coincidental that, when the question is one of belief, a route diagram, like the testimo-
nial triangle, treats the capacities in two groups of two. The triangle, like route diagrams, reflects the
fact that perception and memory are links between an occurrence and a person's later belief about it,
and that the questions of sincerity and articulateness arise between his belief and his statement. But
even in this context-probably the one in which the triangle is most useful-it is not entirely satisfac-
tory, in part because it does not show how the capacities may have failed.
704





The Yale Law Journal
diagram BELIEVE(CLUB) replaces CLUB in the nodes to the right of the
BELIEVE and NOT-BELIEVE nodes.
To conclude from this declaration that BELIEVE(CLUB) is true, the jury
must, precisely as before, assign low probabilities to the propositions that
Knapp was insincere (now represented by the NOT-BELIEVE
(CLUB)-INTEND(BELIEVE(CLUB)) link) or inarticulate (now represented by
the NOT-INTEND(BELIEVE(CLUB))-DECLARATION(BELIEVE(CLUB)) link).
But also as before, the jury need not trace the routes to the left of
BELIEVE(CLUB) to assess the likelihood that Knapp's
perception or memory was faulty. Tacking on "I believe. . ." at the be-
ginning of the declaration thus should not alter the hearsay analysis. If as
amended the declaration is nevertheless to be considered hearsay when
offered to prove the asserted belief, then to prevent the elevation of form
over substance it must be placed within an exception to the rule. And this
is what Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) does. 9 The exception avoids an
anomaly created by the definition of hearsay; as the route diagrams of the
CLUB case show, there is no difference, so far as the policies underlying
the hearsay rule are concerned, between proving BELIEVE(X) with an out-
of-court declaration of BELIEVE(X) or with one of x, even though the first
assertion is offered for its truth and the second is not.
Now let us look at the other side of the coin. Does the assertion of
belief make the declaration less vulnerable to a hearsay objection when it
is offered to prove not Knapp's belief but the truth of the underlying fac-
tual proposition? In other words, could Knapp's lawyer successfully ar-
gue: "As we already know, the jury can use Knapp's declaration of belief
to conclude that he did believe in the clubbing, and that is good circum-
stantial evidence that the clubbing in fact occurred"? Quite plainly, as
Figure 11 indicates, the answer should be no. To use proof of DECLARA-
TION(BELIEVE(CLUB)) to prove CLUB requires the same inferential process
as in any ordinary hearsay case. We have already conceded, as Knapp's
lawyer says, that the jury may use testimony of DECLARA-
TION(BELIEVE(CLUB)) to prove BELIEVE(CLUB), notwithstanding the dan-
gers of insincerity and inarticulateness. But to reason from BELIEVE(CLUB)
69. Under that rule, a "statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind" is not excluded as
hearsay so long as it is not "a statement of memory or belief [offered] to prove the fact remembered or
believed." FED. R. EVID. 803(3). (There is an exception to this qualifying statement. See infra note
74.) Here Knapp's statement is offered to prove his belief, and not the fact believed. Courts usually
find it unnecessary to distinguish between (1) statements of fact that are not hearsay because offered
to prove the declarant's belief rather than the matter asserted, and (2) statements of belief that fit
within the Rule 803(3) exception to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., McCoRMIcK ON EVIDENCE, supra
note 17, § 294, at 843 & n.4; 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 803(3)[02]
(1985).
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back to CLUB requires the jury to minimize possibilities of the remaining
two testimonial incapacities-misperception and faulty memory-for they
provide routes by which events might have reached BEUEVE(CLUB) from
NOT-CLUB. The inferential chain suggested by Knapp's lawyer thus in-
volves all four testimonial incapacities. Using BELIEVE(CLUB) as a step-
ping stone merely divides, but does not shorten or render more certain, the
route linking CLUB and the declaration. Thus, although the matter as-
serted by Knapp-his belief-and the proposition for which it is offered
are not the same, route analysis helps show that the concerns underlying
the hearsay rule are in full force.
An argument similar to the one posed by Knapp's hypothetical counsel
was properly rejected by the United States Supreme Court in the famous
case of Shepard v. United States,7 0 albeit in the lumbering style of Justice
Cardozo rather than in the felicitious phrasing of route analysis. The
Court held that it was error to admit as a declaration of state of mind the
assertion by the murder victim, the defendant's wife, that "Dr. Shepard
has poisoned me." This assertion, wrote Justice Cardozo, was a "declara-
tion[] of memory, pointing backwards to the past. ' 71 Thus, even assuming
BELIEVE(SHEPPOISON)-that Mrs. Shepard believed what she said-that
point might have been reached through NOT-SHEPPOISON and NOT-
PECEIVE(SHEPPOISON), representing a failure of memory. "What is even
more important," added Cardozo, "it spoke to. . . an act by some one not
the speaker." 72 Thus, too, BELIEVE(SHEPPOISON) might have been reached
through NOT-SHEPPOISON and PERCEIVE(SHEPPOISON), a route represent-
ing misperception. If such a statement were not considered hearsay,
"[t]here would be an end, or nearly that, to the rule against hearsay.173
Indeed, to guard against such a result, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3)
provides-except in one narrow context in which the hearsay rule is es-
sentially nullified-that a statement of memory or belief may not be of-
fered to prove the fact remembered or believed.74
In noting that Mrs. Shepard's statement "faced backward and not for-
ward,"7 5 Cardozo was distinguishing an even more famous case, Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon.7' To examine the distinction, we shall
first consider that case in simplified and significantly altered form. Mrs.
Hillmon, claiming that her husband's body was found at Crooked Creek,
70. 290 U.S. 96 (1933).
71. Id. at 106.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See supra note 69. The exception is for a statement that "relates to the execution, revocation,
identification, or terms of declarant's will." FED. R. EviD. 803(3).
75. 290 U.S. at 106.
76. 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
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sues the insurer of his life. The insurer cries fraud and contends that the
body actually belongs to one Walters. A material proposition, which may
be represented by CROOKCREEK in Figure 12, is that Walters went to
Crooked Creek. The insurer offers testimony proving that at an earlier
time Walters made a declaration of PLAN, the proposition that he planned
to go to Crooked Creek; again, we will assume there is no doubt that the
declaration was made.
FIGURE 12
Because PLAN is itself a proposition about the state of Walters' own
mind at the time of his declaration, BELIEVE(PLAN) is-in contrast to the
Shepard case-equivalent to PLAN; accordingly, there is no need to show
nodes representing PERCEIVE(PLAN), BELIEVE(PLAN), or their negations.7
PLAN could be false notwithstanding Walters' declaration if Walters lied
or was inarticulate, but, as we already know, these possibilities will not
alone invoke the hearsay bar.7 8 Proof of PLAN clearly increases the
77. In other words, because there are no possibilities of faulty perception or memory, there is no
link from NOT-PLAN to PERCEIVE(PLAN), or from NOT-PERCEIVE(PLAN) to BELIEVE(PLAN). If events
have reached BELIEVE(PLAN), therefore, they must have come through PLAN and PERCEIVE(PLAN);
PLAN, PERCEIVE(PLAN), and BELIEVE(PLAN) can thus be thought of as one node.
78. See supra text accompanying note 68.
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probability of CROOKCREEK; indeed, in the simple case posited by Figure
12, CROOKCREEK cannot be true unless PLAN is true. Even if PLAN is true,
however, it does not necessarily follow that CROOKCREEK is true.
P(CROOKCREEK given PLAN) is less than certain because after making his
declaration Walters may have changed his mind, or other circumstances
may have intervened.79 These are substantial possibilities; conceivably
they are more substantial than other possibilities-such as the possibility
that Mrs. Shepard's belief was mistaken-that in other contexts cause evi-
dence to be excluded as hearsay. And certainly a jury's ability to evaluate
these possibilities is hampered by the absence of Walters' own testimony
regarding them-especially about Walters' later state of mind. Neverthe-
less, as with the inference of FEAR in Figure 10, these possibilities do not
fit within the standard hearsay mold; they do not represent flaws in the
two capacities, perception and memory, that led to Walters' belief, but
rather contingencies arising after his declaration.8" Accordingly, they do
not invoke the rule against hearsay.
This result would not change if Walters said he was going to Crooked
Creek with his saddlebags, or with his horse. But in the actual case, Wal-
ters wrote that he expected to travel "with a certain Mr. Hillmon . . . for
Colorado or parts unknown to me."81 The Supreme Court held that this
evidence "made it more probable both that [Walters] did go and that he
went with Hillmon, than if there had been no proof of such intention."82
There is a difficulty, however: To conclude that Hillmon and Walters
traveled together, the jury must conclude that each of them had, and car-
ried out, intentions to travel with the other. By the logic of the preceding
paragraph, this poses no hearsay problem so far as Walters' intention is
concerned. But Hilimon's intention is not a matter of Walters' state of
mind. For the jurors to believe that Walters accurately reported Hillmon's
intention, they must conclude not only that Walters was sincere and un-
ambiguous, but also that he accurately perceived and remembered the
state of Hillmon's mind.
Figures 13 through 17 represent the problem. In these diagrams,
79. Tribe, supra note 5, at 971.
80. The testimonial triangle offers no visually appealing way of distinguishing between proof of a
Shepard-type statement such as CLUB in Figure 10 and proof of a proposition such as CROOKCREEK in
Figure 12. Professor Tribe does offer the concept of "time's arrow," running along the right leg of the
triangle in one direction in Shepard and in the other direction in Hillmon. Tribe, supra note 5, at
971. But that leg is itself an arrow, leading from point B (belief of the actor) to C (the conclusion to
which B points). It is unclear whether Tribe means to give the arrow a new meaning or to add a
second set of arrows to the triangle. In any event, a simple triangle cannot simultaneously represent,
and distinguish, the variety of conclusions that might be inferred from the actor's belief in a given
proposition (e.g., truth of the proposition, and conduct by the actor pursuant to his belief).
81. 145 U.S. at 288.
82. Id. at 296.
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WALTPLAN signifies the proposition that Walters intended to travel with
Hillmon, HILLPLAN the proposition that Hillmon intended to travel with
Walters, and JOINTTRIP the material proposition that they in fact jour-
neyed together. As Figure 13 indicates, only if HILLPLAN and WALTPLAN
are true, and even then not with certainty, can JOINTTRIP be true."
3
RILLPLAN b WLP Nad I
PLN AcrinlFiue 4sow o NOW A




tha Waltersl Wroter letters hs dicarams like FigureA 12ake heL
PLA. Acoringy, igue 1 ow h ow LTPA N &a eifre
from ECLAATIONWALT LAN) ANFgr 5soshw ILP N
may e inerrd frm DELARTIOHILLPLAN ) & Bcuei sudsue
Rad aiter altere ecaeda both eA 2ad HL
DECLARATION nodes as given and do not show the TESTIMONY nodes.)
The hearsay rule will not forbid the jury to conclude WALTPLAN from
DECLARATION(WALTPLAN), because that inference, in contrast to the in-
ference of HILLPLAN from DECLARATION(HILLPLAN), does not involve
perception or memory. Concluding HILLPLAN from Walters' declaration
of HILLPLAN, by comparison, is a classic instance of forbidden hearsay, as
indicated by the resemblance of Figure 15 to Figure 11.
83. This assumption is something of a simplification. It ignores the possibility that either Hillmon
or Walters may have acted under the duress of the other, although it is broad enough to account for
the more moderate and common case in which the intent of one is heavily dependent on that of the
other. See infra note 84 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the propositions are defined broadly
enough to put aside the time element. For example, the definitions leave unexplored the possibility
that each man temporarily wished to travel with the other, but that they never both had the wish at
the same time. Rhett and Scarlett loved each other passionately, but their timing was off. See also
infra note 86.
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FIGURE 14
Yet the matter does not end there. It is possible that DECLARA-
TION(WALTPLAN), by helping to prove WALTPLAN, can significantly sup-
port JOINTTRIP even without reliance on DECLARATION(HILLPLAN). Wal-
ters' intention to travel with Hillmon reflected his perception and memory
that Hillmon intended to travel with him. To take an extreme case, sup-
pose that, as indicated by Figure 16, WALTPLAN could not be true unless
BELIEVE(HILLPLAN) is true-that is, for some reason (coyness, an inferi-
ority complex, a judge-like desire not to decide unnecessary questions,
etc.), Walters would not develop the intention of traveling with Hillmon
unless he believed that Hillmon wanted to travel with him. This diagram
shows that DECLARATION(WALTPLAN) offered to prove HILLPLAN, al-
though not hearsay in its purest form, raises all four hearsay dangers;
Walters may have misperceived or misremembered HILLPLAN, and may
have been insincere or inarticulate in declaring WALTPLAN. Thus, the in-
ference of HILLPLAN suggested by Figure 16 should not provide a means
of avoiding the hearsay rule.
In a converse variation, however, proof of WALTPLAN makes HILLPLAN
more likely, not because WALTPLAN reflects Walters' perception and
memory of HILLPLAN, but because something in the relationship of Wal-
ters and Hillmon suggests that Hillmon's intention depends on Walters'
intention. Suppose, for example, that Hillmon was Walters' faithful man-
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servant, or that Walters was a high-paying expedition leader whose invi-
tation to join him would almost certainly be accepted gladly by Hillmon.
8 4
Figure 17 diagrams such a case. Here, Hillmon could not form an inten-
tion to go with Walters unless Walters formed the reciprocal intention,
and the relative thickness of the arrows suggests that proof of WALTPLAN
is tantamount to proof of HILLPLAN. Together (as we know from Figure
13), the two propositions increase the probability of JOINTTRIP.
WALTPLANI
FIGURE 17
But the actual case more resembled that of Figure 16: Hillmon was the
generous leader-or so it appeared to Walters 8 5 -and Walters was the
more dependent party. Let us therefore make the assumption, a harsh one
from the viewpoint of the proponent of the evidence, that proof of Wal-
ters' intention does not alter the probability that Hillmon intended to
travel with him.8
84. Or suppose, to move matters from Crooked Creek towards Palm Beach, that Walters was a
major league baseball manager who expressed his intention of traveling north from spring training
with Hillmon, a rookie, still on the squad. Surely it would be reasonable to conclude that if Walters
intended to travel with Hillmon then Hillmon intended to travel with Walters.
85. Walters, in essence, wrote his fiancee that Hillmon had made him a munificent employment
offer that he could not refuse. 145 U.S. at 288-89.
86. Mathematically, this expression means that P(sLLPAN) equals P(HILLPLAN given WALT-
PLAN). Some readers may note an apparent paradox: if this assumption is true, then, because
P(HILLPLAN) X P(WALTPLAN given HILLPLAN) = P(HILLPLAN & WALTPLAN) = P(WALTPLAN)
X P(HILLPLAN given WALTPLAN), it follows that P(WALTPLAN) = P(WALTPLAN given HILLPLAN).
This last equation appears to preclude the possibility that Walters' intention was dependent on
Hillmon's. Recall, however, that WALTPLAN and HILLPLAN have been defined broadly, disregarding
the time element. See supra note 83. If the propositions were defined more precisely-for example,
WALTPREPLAN to represent Walters' intention before Hillmon stated his intention, and WALTPOST-
PLAN to represent Walters' intention afterwards-the apparent paradox would disappear. For present
purposes, using the more precise definitions would add an unnecessary complexity.
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If the material proposition at issue were HILLPLAN, this would settle
the matter. But here the material proposition is JOINTTRip, and we have
posited that JOINTTRIP cannot be true if WALTPLAN is not. Proof that
WALTPLAN is true therefore eliminates one of the contingencies that could
prevent JOINTTRIP from being true, and so necessarily increases the
probability of JOINTTRIP.8 7 Or, as Figure 13 shows, proof of WALTPLAN
eliminates two nodes-HILLPLAN & NOT-WALTPLAN and NOT-HILLPLAN
& NOT-WALTPLAN-that are compatible only with NOT-JOINTTRIP, and
so necessarily increases the probability of JOINTTRIP. Proof of WALTPLAN
therefore has probative value with respect to JOINTTRIP, even assuming
that WALTPLAN has no bearing on the probability of HILLPLAN. Thus,
even disregarding Walters' perception and memory of external facts, the
Supreme Court was justified in concluding that proof of Walters' inten-
tion "made it more probable both that he did go and that he went with
Hillmon, than if there had been no proof of such intention.""8
But even if the evidence has nonhearsay relevance, it is not necessarily
admissible. That decision also requires a judgment as to whether the pro-
bative value of the evidence is outweighed by potential harmful effects,
such as prejudice and confusion.89 The probative value is greatest if (1)
WALTPLAN was not a foregone conclusion, and (2) apart from proof of
WALTPLAN, there is a substantial probability that JOINTTRIP is true.90 In
.87. That is, because P(JoiNrriP given NOT-WALTPLAN) is zero, P(JoIiNrRIP given WALTPLAN)
must be greater than P(JoIo'TRsP). This is readily demonstrated. P(JoNrIP) = [P(WALTPLAN)
X P(josNTTRiP given WALTPLAN)] + [P(NOT-WALTPLAN) X P(jOINTTRIP given NOT-WALTPLAN)].
But because the last probability, P(Jonrrrip giwen NOT-WALTPLAN), equals zero, this equation sim-
plifies to PoOINTTRIP) = P(WALTPLAN) X P(JoIwrrIP given WALTPLAN). P(WALTPLAN), the
prior probability of WALTPLAN, is less than one, and so P(loiNrmhsp) must be less than P(JoiN'rrJP
given WALTPLAN). If we could say only that P(JoiNTrRIP given NOT-WALTPLAN) is very small, and
not that it is definitely zero-if, for example, Hillmon conceivably could have drugged Walters and
taken him along-the same inference, albeit somewhat weakened, would still apply.
Thus, Walters' intention, WAL'TAN, has probative value because the probability of the material
proposition, joiNTRip, depends in part on whether Walters was a willing participant. If the
probability of jomlhxrP were solely dependent on Hillmon's intention, HILLPLAN, or if HILLPLAN
itself were the material proposition at issue, this analysis would not apply.
88. 145 U.S. at 296; see supra text accompanying note 82.
89. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
90. By definition, see supra text accompanying notes 14-16, PV(WALTPLAN w.r.t. JOINTTRIP)
equals P(JOINTrRIP given WALTPLAN) - P(jormiTRip). Because P(JooNrrRIP) = P(JOINT'RIP
given WALTPLAN) X P(WALTPLAN), see supra note 87,
PV(WALTPLAN W.r.t. JOINTTRIP) = P(JoINTTRIP given WALTPLAN) - [P(JOINTTRIP
given WALTPLAN) X P(WALTPLAN)]
=P(joiNmRIP given WALTPLAN)(I - P(WALTPLAN)).
(N8)
Using the fact that P(JoINTTRIP given WALTPLAN) = P(JOINTTiRP) + P(WALTPLAN) (from the
expression for P(JoirsiP), see supra), this transforms to
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Hilmon these criteria appear to have been met.9
Nevertheless, there is a serious danger of prejudice. For decades, the
Hillmon doctrine has befuddled courts,
9 2 rulemakers,93 and academics, 9 4
1 - P(WALTPLAN)






where O(WALTPLAN) is the odds of WALTPLAN. Thus, the probative value of WALTPLAN with respect
to JOINTTRIP is greatest if the prior likelihood Of JOINTrRIP was substantial and the prior likelihood
of WALTPLAN was small.
Alternatively, because
P(JOINTTRIP)=P(WALTPLAN) X P(HILLPLAN given WALTPLAN) X P(jOINTTRIP
given HILLPLAN & WALTPLAN),
(N10)
we can express Equation N9 as
PV(WALTPLAN w.r.t. joINTTRIP)=
1 - P(WALTPLAN) P(WALTPLAN) X P(HLLPLAN given WALTMAN) X
P(WALTPLAN) ) P (JOINTTRIP given HILLPLAN & WALTPLAN))
=[I - P(WALTPLAN)] X P(HILLPLAN given WALTPLAN) X
POOINTTRIP given HILLPLAN & WALTPLAN).
(NI1)
And because by hypothesis P(HILLPLAN) equals P(HILLPLAN given WALTPLAN), see supra note 86,
this becomes
PV(WALTPLAN .r.t JOINTTRIP) = [1 - P(WALTPLAN)] X P(HILLPLAN) X
P(JOINTTRIP given HILLPLAN & WALTPLAN).
(N12)
Thus, a manager's statement of intent to travel north with a rookie, see supra note 84, is strongly
probative of joint travel, because the rookie's intent was a foregone conclusion but the manager's was
far less likely. For similar reasons, the rookie's statement of intent to travel north with the manager
has low probative value.
91. As to WALTPLAN, it appears clear from the case that, apart from his letters, there was no
direct indication of Walters' intention. Although less clear, the essense of the Court's logic seems to be
that there was a substantial prior probability of joINrRIP that the letters could augment: "In view of
the mass of conflicting testimony introduced upon the question whether it was the body of Walters
that was found in Hillmon's camp, this evidence might properly influence the jury in determining that
question." 145 U.S. at 296.
92. See, e.g., People v. Alcalde, 24 Cal. 2d 177, 148 P.2d 627 (1944) (holding, over Justice Tray-
nor's dissent, that murder victim's statement, earlier in day of murder, that she intended to be with
defendant that night could be used to show the two did meet). Compare United States v. Pheaster, 544
F.2d 353, 379-80 (9th Cir. 1976) (declarant's assertion of state of mind allowed to prove the actions
of another person) with Gual Morales v. Hernandez Vega, 579 F.2d 677, 681 (1st Cir. 1978) (disal-
lowing same type of proof). See generally Note, One Person's Thoughts, Another Person's Acts: How
the Federal Circuit Courts Interpret the Hillmon Doctrine, 33 CATH. U.L. REv. 699, 704-05, 715 &
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and with good reason: As suggested by the above discussion and the array
of Figures 13 through 17-each itself something of a simplification-this
type of case poses extremely subtle problems. 5 It may be asking too much
to expect a jury to consider WALTPLAN for the light it casts on JOINTTRIP
but to exclude from that consideration the natural inference that if WALT-
PLAN is true the declarant probably perceived and remembered HILLPLAN
to be true.
The distinction suggested here, however, is more comprehensible than
the dichotomy suggested by other analyses of the problem,9" under which
the statement would be admissible for its bearing on the acts of the declar-
ant but not on those of the other person. That distinction, even if coherent,
is far too subtle to be workable, at least when the essence of the declara-
tion, and of the proposition for which it is offered, is that the two persons
engaged in the asserted act together. The analysis described here acknowl-
edges that the declarant's intention to engage in the common activity was
one of the preconditions to occurrence of the activity. Thus, proof of the
intention necessarily makes the occurrence, which by definition required
the participation of both persons, more likely; the jury is barred only from
reevaluating the probability of a second precondition-the intention of the
other person-by relying on the declarant's perception and memory of
that intention.
Several cross-cutting points have emerged from this route analysis of
Hillmon-type problems. A brief summary might be helpful:
(1) DECLARATION(WALTPLAN) as proof of WALTPLAN. A declaration of
intention is not hearsay under the traditional approach when offered to
prove that the declarant in fact had that intention. Such a declaration may
be the product of insincerity or of inarticulateness, but not of failed per-
ception or memory. Even when the intention is material only because of
n.108 (1984) ("federal courts have split" on the doctrine).
93. Compare FED. R. EviD. 803(3) advisory committee's note (rule leaves Hilimon doctrine "un-
disturbed") with the House Committee on the Judiciary's report on Fed. R. Evid. 803(3), H.R. REP.
No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1973) (intending "that the Rule be construed to limit the...
[Hillmon doctrine] so as to render statements of intent of a declarant admissible only to prove his
future conduct, not the future conduct of another person."). The author of Note, supra note 92,
concluded that "instead of silencing critics and settling the matter, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3)
and the various reports accompanying the rules failed to clarify the scope of the Hillmon doctrine."
Id. at 704-05 (footnote omitted).
94. See Note, supra note 92, at 714-15 (noting academic split and confusion). The classic treat-
ment of Hillmon remains Maguire, The Hillmon Case-Thirty-Three years After, 38 HARv. L. REv.
709 (1925). For a helpful survey of the topic, see McFarland, Dead Men Tell Tales: Thirty Times
Three Years of the Judicial Process After Hillmon, 30 ViLL. L. REv. 1 (1985).
95. A unified diagram, intended to represent in a single map the variation discussed in connection
with Figure 16 is presented in Appendix F. This diagram can cause sturdy minds to boggle-but so
can the Hillmon problem itself.
96. E.g., People v. Alcalde, 24 Cal. 2d 177, 189-90, 148 P.2d 627, 633 (1944) (Traynor, J.,
dissenting); Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) and the Criminal Defendant: The Limits of the
Hillmon Doctrine, 35 VAND. L. REv. 659, 703-05 (1982).
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the possible inference that the declarant acted in accordance with the in-
tention (as when PLAN in Figure 12 is proven to support a contention of
CROOKCREEK), the declaration should not be considered hearsay.
(2) DECLARATION(HILLPLAN) as proof of HILLPLAN. A declaration,
whether implicit or explicit, of someone else's intention should be consid-
ered hearsay under the traditional approach when offered to prove that
the other person had, or acted in accordance with, that intention. Thus,
DECLARATION(HILLPLAN) in Figure 15 should be considered hearsay
when offered to prove HILLPLAN, because the declaration of Hillmon's
intention is made by Walters and so raises all four dangers.
(3) DECLARATION(WALTPLAN) as proof of HILLPLAN. The assertion of
the declarant's own intention may, however, have some probative value in
determining the other person's intention and conduct.
(a) If, as in Figure 16, the assertion is offered because the declar-
ant's intention reflects his belief in the other person's intention, it should
be considered hearsay because it involves all four hearsay dangers: the
dangers that the declarant misperceived and misremembered the other
person's intention, and the dangers that he was insincere and inarticulate
regarding his own intention.
(b) If the assertion of the declarant's intention is offered because the
other person's intention was dependent on the declarant's, as in Figure 17,
then it should not be considered hearsay; as with (1), the assertion raises
the dangers of insincerity and inarticulateness, but not those of failed per-
ception or memory.
(4) DECLARATION(WALTPLAN) as proof Of JOINTTRIP. If the material
question is whether the declarant and the other person engaged in conduct
jointly, then each person's willingness to engage in the conduct is a predi-
cate to the proposition that they did so. Under the logic summarized in
paragraph 3(b), the declarant's assertion of his own intention may allow
the non-hearsay inference that the other person is willing, and if so, it also
makes the joint conduct more probable. But even if this logic is not appli-
cable, because the other person's intention is not dependent on the declar-
ant's, the declaration helps establish the other predicate to the joint con-
duct-the declarant's own willingness-and so may make the joint
conduct more probable. Thus, if, as in Figure 13, JOINTTRIP is more
probable when WALTPLAN is known to be true than when WALTPLAN is
in doubt, DECLARATION(WALTPLAN) makes JOINTTRIP more probable by
helping to prove WALTPLAN. The relevance of the declaration for this the-
ory is greatest if, as assessed apart from the declaration, (a) there is a
substantial probability that the two people engaged in the joint conduct,
and (b) the declarant's willingness to engage in the conduct is not a fore-
gone conclusion. There may, however, be a substantial problem of
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prejudice in offering the declarant's assertion on this ground, because the
jury may well take it as an assertion of the other person's intention as
well as of the declarant's. As with all evidence, if the potential prejudice
of the declaration outweighs its probative value, the declaration should not
be admitted.
2. Other Problems Concerning Intermediate Points
We have seen that, if BELIEVE(X) is a material proposition, standard
hearsay doctrine will allow it to be proved by an out-of-court declaration
of either x or BELIEVE(X). A fortiori, proof of an out-of-court declaration
of x or of INTEND(X) may be used to prove INTEND(X), that the declarant
intended to assert X. 9 7 INTEND(X) is closer to DECLARATION(X) than is
BELIEVE(X), and a diagram in the form of Figure 8 shows only one
route-indicating inarticulateness-by which events might have reached
DECLARATION(X) without passing through INTEND(X).
Now let us look to the left of BELIEVE(X). We have seen that the reason
that standard hearsay doctrine allows evidence of DECLARATION(X) to
prove BELIEVE(X) is that this does not raise dangers of misperception or
faulty memory. 8 But prevailing doctrine does not demand, as a prerequi-
site to admissibility, that both dangers to the left of BELIEVE(X) be elimi-
nated. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1), an out-of-court declara-
tion of x may be used to prove x itself if it is one "describing or
explaining an event or condition" and it was "made while the declarant
was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter." The
first requirement allows the possibility of misperception, so long as that
possibility fits within the broad category of a mistaken "sense impres-
sion," but the second eliminates the chance of failed memory. This second
condition could be represented on Figure 8, for example, if Shopper
Two's declaration of the spill was made while observing it, by merging
the PERCEIVE(SPILL) and BELIEVE(SPILL) nodes (and likewise the NOT-
PERCEIVE(SPILL) and NOT-BELIEVE(SPILL) nodes). Because the declaration
was made at the time of the perception, the propositions ordinarily repre-
sented by two nodes-the declarant's state of mind at the time of the per-
ception and at the time of declaration, respectively-are identical. There
is thus no link between the NOT-PERCEIVE(SPILL) and BELIEVE(SPILL)
97. For example, where an out-of-court declaration of x is allegedly fraudulent, the plaintiff of-
fers proof of the declaration to show not only that the statement was made (DECLARATION(x)), but
also that the declarant intended the message conveyed (INTEND(x)). The plaintiff does not offer the
evidence to prove BELIEVE(X); in fact, it is part of his case to prove NOT-BELIEVE(X). This analysis
would not change if, for some strange reason, the declarant asserted not x but IrrEND(X): "I want to
tell you . .. ."
98. See supra Section III.B.1.
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nodes, for there was no opportunity for a failure of memory. Significant
dangers of failed perception, sincerity,"9 and articulateness remain, but the
statement may be admitted.
Hearsay doctrine tends to take a less generous attitude when the situa-
tion is reversed-that is, when there is a danger of faulty memory (be-
cause the declaration was made after the perception, so that the PER-
CEIVE(X) and BELIEVE(X) nodes are not identical) but not of
misperception. That danger might be eliminated in either of two ways.
First, it might be that x is the material proposition but there is substan-
tially no probability that the declarant misperceived x. This is so when x
concerns facts of the declarant's own condition, bodily or mental, that a
person ordinarily perceives accurately.100 If we conclude that the declarant
did indeed perceive the condition, we will conclude, virtually inevitably,
that the condition existed; it does not matter whether the statement is in
the form of DECLARATION(X)-such as "my nose was congested"-or of
DECLARATION(PERCEIVE(X))-such as "I felt chest pains." The x and
PERCEIVE(x) nodes are essentially identical. But if the condition assertedly
existed in the past, these nodes are not identical to BELIEVE(X), and a
memory problem remains.
Second, it may be that although there is a real possibility that the de-
clarant could have falsely perceived x, PERCEIVE(X) rather than x itself is
the material proposition. For example, in Garford Trucking Co. v.
Mann,101 the principal issue was whether the defendant's truck driver,
one Glogowski, was acting within the scope of his employment at the time
of an accident. It was therefore a material question what his state of mind
99. Note, however, that according to the advisory committee, the underlying theory of the excep-
tion "is that substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negative the likelihood of deliberate
or conscious misrepresentation." FED. R. EviD. 803(1) advisory committee's note. This is an optimis-
tic overgeneralization. True, there may be circumstances in which contemporaneity provides some
assurance of sincerity-as when the recipient of the declaration is in a position to make the same
observations as the declarant. But it hardly seems true that self-interest is so slow to affect one's
conduct that it can be presumed to have no effect on a statement commenting on current happenings;
ordinary experience suggests that in simple situations people tend to recognize, and if necessary act
upon, their self-interest immediately. And yet Rule 803(1) makes no special provision for self-serving
statements. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 17, § 290.
100. We have already seen, see supra note 77 and accompanying text, that when x is a statement
about the declarant's state of mind at the time of the declaration it is equivalent to BEL EVE(X). There
is not the same identity when x concerns a bodily sensation, but still applicable is the general proposi-
tion that because "what one perceives as his physical or mental sensations are his sensations, there is
ordinarily no possibility of erroneous perception." Tribe, supra note 5, at 965. Not all statements of
bodily condition fit within this logic, however; whereas "I have a sore throat" speaks only of sensa-
tions and so presents no perception problem, the same cannot be said for "I have cancer of the pan-
creas." Indeed, there may be some mental feelings, such as love, that are so complex that they raise
perception problems because the declarant may be unable to identify them with certainty. Id.; see S.
CAHN, WALKING HAPPY ("I don't think I'm in love"); L. HART, THE BOYS FROM SYRACMSE ("This
can't be love"). But see F. LOESSER, GuYS AND DOLLS ("I'll know when my love comes along").
101. 163 F.2d 71 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 810 (1947).
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was in choosing to take one route rather than another between two points
on his journey. The plaintiff offered proof that, some days after the acci-
dent, Glogowski stated that he had taken Route 126 because it was
quicker to travel, albeit longer in distance, than Route 9."12 If that pro-
position is represented as 126QUICKER, the declaration was offered to
prove PERCEIVE(126QUICKER), Glogowski's perception at the time of his
travel. Admissibility of Glogowski's statement probably should not depend
on whether it was in the form DECLARATION(126QUICKER) ("Route 126
is quicker"), DECLARATION(PERCEIVE(126QUICKER)) ("I thought Route
126 is quicker"), or DECLARATION(BELIEVE(126QUICKER)) ("I think
Route 126 is quicker").103 In any event there is no hearsay danger of
misperception-although Glogowski's perception of 126QUICKER certainly
might have been mistaken, it is PERCEIVE(126QUICKER), not 126QUICKER,
that is the proposition at issue.
But both in the Garford-type case and with statements of past bodily
condition, the other three dangers remain. As indicated by Figure 8,
events might have proceeded from NOT-PERCEIVE(X) to the declaration via
any of three routes: (1) through the BELIEVE(X).node (representing failure
of memory); (2) through NOT-BELIEVE(X) and then the INTEND(X) node
(insincerity); and (3) through NOT-BELIEVE(X) and then the NOT-
INTEND(X) node (inarticulateness). The traditional rule in such cases is
reflected in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3), which in general permits
admission of "[a] statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind,
emotion, sensation, or physical condition. ' 10 4 As the rule suggests, state-
102. Id. at 72.
103. A fine distinction is possible, however. To infer PERCEIVE(X) from DECLARA-
TION(PERCEIVE(x)) requires confidence in Glogowski's memory of his own prior state of mind, which
is arguably less of a problem than his memory of an external fact. But cf Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 295 (1892) (declarant's "own memory of his state of mind at a former time is
no more likely to be clear and true than a bystander's recollection of what he then said"). If, however,
one is to conclude PERCEIVE(X) from DECLARATION(X) or DECLARATION(BELIEVE(X)), it is his mem-
ory of a perceived external fact-that Route 126 was quicker-that must be accurate.
Sometimes such questions of form have a more substantial bearing on admissibility. Suppose the
material proposition is that Popeye liked olives some years ago. His recent out-of-court statement, "I
liked olives back then," like Glogowski's, raises all the hearsay dangers except misperception. If,
however, what Popeye said recently is "I like olives," inference of the material proposition depends
not on the accuracy of his memory but on the constancy of his tastebuds. That is, this statement
proves the material proposition if it is sincere and articulate and if we have confidence that Popeye
responded in prior years as he did recently to the stimulus of olives on his tongue. Perhaps cross-
examination is not necessary to gain that confidence. The literary-minded reader may have anticipated
a related problem: Suppose the material proposition is that Popeye liked Olive back then, and his
recent out-of-court statement is "I like Olive." Again, failure of memory as such seems not to be a
problem. Here, though, the stimuli-including Olive's actions and attitude towards Popeye-are more
likely to have changed over time. In itself, that is a problem of relevance, not of hearsay. But it is also
true that Popeye's response-even if the stimuli have remained the same and especially if they have
not-may very well have altered over the years. That is a possibility that may be difficult to assess
without examining Popye.
104. FED. R. EvID. 803(3) (emphasis added); see also 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra
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ments expressing the declarant's prior state of mind or bodily condition
are usually considered inadmissible. 10 5 Under this limitation, declarations
of mental or bodily condition cannot be admitted unless they satisfy the
second requirement of Rule 803(1), contemporaneity. Such declarations
also satisfy the first requirement of that rule, for by definition they state
sense impressions, and of a particular sort. Thus, the Rule 803(3) excep-
tion is "essentially a specialized application of [Rule 803(1)],111 °6 one with
especially strong justification because the danger of misperception, as well
as that of failed memory, is eliminated.
The Rules' lack of symmetry-admitting a declaration when the only
danger eliminated is failed memory but not when it is mispercep-
tion-may not be sensible, but in practice there appears to be more flexi-
bility than the Rules indicate. Possibly recognizing that declarations of
past states of mind present no perception problems, some courts do admit
such declarations so long as the danger of failed memory is small. 07 In-
deed, Garford approved admission of Glogowski's statement; that case,
however, is regarded as stretching hearsay doctrine to the limit or
beyond. 08
note 69, % 803(3)[03], at 803-114 ("Rule 803(3) restates the traditional requirement that the state-
ment must relate to a then existing state of mind.").
105. See, e.g., R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELREID & E. KIONKA, supra note 5, at 475 (noting also
that California admits statements of prior states of mind under some conditions); E. MORGAN, BASIC
PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 296 (J. Weinstein 5th ed. 1976); 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1722, at 122
(J. Chadbourn rev. 1976).
106. FED. R. EVID. 803(3) advisory committee's note.
107. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 69, t 803(3)[03], at 803-114 to -115 &
sources cited nn.13-15. The "notion of the continuity in time of states of mind," MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 17, at 844, has been offered in support of the broad proposition that "[a]
statement of the declarant's present state of mind is admissible to prove a past state of mind in issue."
Edwards & Hanley v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 458 F. Supp. 1110, 1118 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), rev'd on other grounds, 602 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980);
accord Slough, Spontaneous Statements and State of Mind, 46 IowA L. REv. 224, 231-32 (1961)
(because of permissible assumption that "given state of mind will continue over a reasonable period of
time," "[w]hen mental condition is directly in issue, [it] should be subject to proof by declarations both
prior and subsequent"). This proposition seems justifiable in some cases but not in others, depending
on whether the presumed continuity in state of mind is based on an assumed constancy of memory or
of response to an external stimulus. See supra note 103. In the one case, the jury reasons that, given
the declarant's later belief in x (e.g., "Route 126 is quicker"), he probably remembered it from, and
so believed in it at, the prior time. To permit that inference without cross-examining the declarant is
essentially to abandon memory as a hearsay concern. But where the jury reasons that, given the
declarant's recent response to an external stimulus, he probably reacted the same way at a prior time,
memory questions never come into play.
108. E. MORGAN, supra note 105, at 297; 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 69,
803(3)[03], at 803-115 n.15; Recent Case, 27 NEB. L. REv. 450, 452 (1948).
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3. Out-of-Court Conduct Offered To Prove the Truth of an
Apparently Implicit Belief
As the Shepard case 09 indicated, the inference from a declaration to its
truth may be broken down into parts: from the declaration to the declar-
ant's belief in the truth of the matter asserted, and from that belief to the
truth itself. A declaration is just one form of conduct, however, and there
are other types of out-of-court conduct that may be relevant by an appar-
ently similar two-step inference, from the conduct to the actor's belief in
the truth of a material proposition, and from that belief to the truth of the
proposition.11 0 Such conduct may take various forms. Consider again vari-
ations on Wright v. Tatham,"'1 where conduct of Ellershaw was offered
to show that he believed Marsden had sufficient mental capacity to make
his will, and therefore that Marsden did have the capacity. Ellershaw's
conduct might be noncommunicative 1 2 -if, for example, he attended a
lecture by Marsden, one might possibly infer that he believed Marsden to
have at least some remaining mental capacity. Or the conduct might be
communicative but not assertive-the inference of Ellershaw's belief could
be drawn from letters he wrote to Marsden asking sophisticated questions
but not asserting any facts. Or the conduct might even be assertive, but of
a proposition different from the one that it is used to prove-the material
inference might be drawn from the fact that Ellershaw found it worth-
while to pass on to Marsden complex information concerning Marsden's
business affairs. In each of these cases, the conduct does not assert the
material proposition, but apparently indicates that the actor believed in
that proposition. When used to prove the proposition, the conduct may
raise significant hearsay problems.
Figure 18 can be used to represent any of the illustrations just given.
MARSOUND represents the proposition at issue-in each case, that Mars-
den is of sound mind. CONDUCT represents the out-of-court conduct of
Ellershaw that is offered to prove that proposition. (Figure 18 assumes
that CONDUCT is undisputed; there is thus no need to show the TMTI-
MONY nodes.) As in the case of ordinary hearsay, the inference from CON-
109. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
110. See generally Falknor, The "Hear-Say" Rule as a "See-Do" Rule: Evidence of Conduct, 33
RocKy MTN. L. REv. 133 (1961). As the accompanying text paragraph suggests, the label "nonas-
sertive conduct," sometimes applied to such behavior, e.g., id. at 137; R. LEmPERT & S. SALTZBURG,
supra note 5, at 366, does not sufficiently describe it in all its forms.
111. 7 Eng. Rep. 559 (H.L. 1838), affg Wright v. Doe d. Tatham, 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (Ex. Ch.
1837); see supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
112. That some conduct is not intended, either consciously or subconsciously, to convey a message,
was perhaps suggested by Freud: "Sometimes a cigar is just a cigar." Attributed in J. BARTLEmT,
FAMILAR QUOTATIONS 679 (E. Beck 15th ed. 1980).
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 96: 667, 1987
Credibility and Hearsay
DUCT back to MARSOUND uses BELIEVE(MARSOUND) as a stepping stone.
And the inference of MARSOUND from BELIEVE(MARSOUND) is the same as
in the case of ordinary hearsay; from 0 to BELIEVE(MARSOUND) and NOT-
BELIEVE(MARSOUND) the route diagram is identical (except for the names
of the nodes) to the pertinent parts of Figure 8, the diagram for an ordi-
nary hearsay assertion.
Put another way, a factfinder could logically conclude that Ellershaw
believed that Marsden was sane, either because Ellershaw made an asser-
tion to that effect or because the belief appeared to be implicit in his con-
duct. In either case, once Ellershaw's belief is discerned the factfinder
can-if permitted by the hearsay rule-draw the further inference that
Marsden was indeed sane. When the factfinder is asked to draw that in-
ference, the first case, Ellershaw's assertion, will clearly be considered
hearsay, while the second, which characterizes the Wight situation, gen-
erally will not be under modern law. This is so notwithstanding the fact
that the first two hearsay dangers are present in the two cases: However
the factfinder has determined Ellershaw's belief, the inference that Mars-
den was in fact sane depends on a conclusion that Ellershaw's capacities
of perception and memory have not failed-i.e., that Ellershaw has not
failed to perceive a mental defect of Marsden's or forgotten it since their
last contact.
The Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence, however,
contended that the dangers of failed perception and memory "are minimal
in the absence of an intent to assert." '118 This claim is, at the very least, a
great overgeneralization. True, often the very fact that an actor has en-
gaged in conduct for a purpose other than communication suggests that he
relied with care on his perception and memory, for if they were faulty his
conduct could affect him adversely. But communicative conduct, of course,
also can often have significant consequences for the actor.1 14 And it is
undeniable that even noncommunicative conduct is often based on inaccu-
rate beliefs, produced by errors of either perception or memory. The per-
ception and memory concerns underlying the hearsay rule would be better
addressed by ascertaining whether the conduct is of the type in which the
actor would probably engage only if he were confident of the disputed
fact, rather than by determining whether or not he asserted that fact.
Although Figures 8 and 18 are identical in format from o to the BE-
LIEVE column, from there to the right they are significantly different. As-
sume that Ellershaw's conduct is no more than what it appears to be on
113. FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee's note.
114. See Park, supra note 40, at 453 n.100. For example, making an accusation about one's co-
worker may well cause very unpleasant repercussions if the accusation is false; the accusation is never-
theless considered hearsay.
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its face. If events passed through BELIEVE(MARSOUND) on their way to
CONDUCT they need not have passed through INTEND(MARSOUND), for by
hypothesis Ellershaw did not intend to communicate MARSOUND, and a
fortiori did not do so articulately. Thus, assessing P(CONDUCT given BE-
LIEVE(MARSOUND)) does not require a jury to rely on Ellershaw's capaci-
ties of sincerity and articulateness-the jury need not determine how well
these capacities operated, because if Ellershaw's conduct is taken at face
value, as the proponent of the evidence contends it should be, they never
came into play at all. Rather, the jury need only determine how likely it is
that Ellershaw, believing Marsden to be of sound mind, would have writ-
ten the letter. To make that determination, the jury might have to con-
sider many factors-the relationship of the two men, Ellershaw's willing-
ness to communicate the information by letter, and so forth-but not
Ellershaw's sincerity and articulateness in communicating an assertion of
Marsden's sanity.
But P(BELIEVE(MARSOUND) given CONDUCT), not P(CONDUCT given
BELIEVE(MARSOUND)), is what the jury is really after. Granted, under
Bayesian reasoning P(BELIEVE(MARSOUND) given CONDUCT) depends in
part on P(CONDUCT given BELIEVE(MARSOUND)); that is, for the jurors to
determine from Ellershaw's conduct how likely it is that he believed in
Marsden's sanity, they should assess how likely it is that he would have
acted that way if he so believed. But the jury might be able to determine
what it needs to know about P(CONDUCT given BELIEVE(MARSOUND))
reasonably well even without hearing the cross-examination of Eller-
shaw.115 It is far more critical for the jury to have a good estimate of
P(CONDUCT given NOT-BELIEVE(MARSOUND))-the probability that El-
lershaw would have acted the way he did if he did not so believe. We
must therefore examine the routes by which events might have reached
CONDUCT from NOT-BELIEVE(MARSOUND).
On one such path, as indicated by Figure 18, Ellershaw did after all
intend to convey a message concerning the state of Marsden's mind. It
could be, for example, that Ellershaw knew Marsden to be insane but
intended the letter to persuade Marsden both of Marsden's sanity and of
Ellershaw's belief in Marsden's sanity-all so that Ellershaw could take
control of Marsden's affairs for his own benefit. Thus, one cannot infer
115. To be more precise, what the jury may be able to determine with some confidence, even
absent cross-examination, is that there are no factors that substantially diminish the probability of
CONDUCT given BELIEVE(MARSOUND) without similarly affecting the probability of CONDUCT given
NOT-BELIEVE(MARSOUND). The jury probably cannot evaluate the probability of contingencies that
diminish the probability of CONDUCT equally given BELIEVE(MARSOUND) or NOT-
BELIEVE(MARSOUND)-but it does not need to, because these "screens," which have no effect on the
likelihood ratio of the evidence, do not alter the probability of BELIEVE(MARSOUND) given CONDUCT.
See A Diagrammatic Approach, supra note 1, at 615 & n.67.
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BELIEVE(MARSOUND) from CONDUCT without relying on Ellershaw's
sincerity-not in the sense that sincere communication is necessary to
make a path from BELIEVE(MARSOUND) to CONDUCT, but because an in-
sincere communication is one possible explanation of how events might
have proceeded from NOT-BELIEVE(MARSOUND) to CONDUCT.
It also may be conceivable that Ellershaw's conduct was intended to
communicate a message, but one other than Marsden's sanity, and that it
was inarticulate in doing so. This possibility would mean both that con-
duct noncommunicative on its face was in fact communicative and that
Ellershaw performed the communication poorly; thus, it is probably
rather insignificant.
But this possibility of inarticulateness is part of a more general possibil-
ity that may be highly significant. It could be, for any of various reasons,
that Ellershaw acted the way he did notwithstanding a belief in Mars-
den's insanity but without any intention to convey an inaccurate message.
Perhaps, for example, Ellershaw sent the letter to enjoy a rather cruel
private joke. Or perhaps Ellershaw knew that Marsden's steward secretly
took care of Marsden's business affairs but would only answer correspon-
dence if it preserved form by addressing Marsden himself.116
Even if Ellershaw's conduct was almost certainly not produced by inar-
ticulateness, therefore, the proffered evidence suffers from a broader in-
herent problem of ambiguity. Figure 18 represents this problem by the
route leading to CONDUCT through NOT-BELIEVE(MARSOUND) and NOT-
INTEND(MARSOUND).
1 1 7
The ordinary problem of inarticulateness, as presented by an out-of-
court assertion, DECLARATION(X), is narrow; if it is known that the de-
clarant intended an assertion, the problem is simply that the message he
conveyed may not have been the message he intended. But that is not the
situation in a case like Wright. There, the out-of-court conduct may not
even have been assertive (hence, it is labeled, more generally, CONDUCT),
and in fact it appeared on its face to be nonassertive. Thus, the conduct
could have many explanations consistent with NOT-BELIEVE(MARSOUND)
and NOT-INTEND(MARSOUND) but having nothing to do with a failure to
articulate. Probably more than the narrow problem of inarticulateness,
116. See Park, supra note 40, at 452-53 n.100.
117. The path from BELIEVE(MARSOUND) to CONDUCT could also be pictured as leading through
NOT-INTEND(MARSOUND), or even as being composed of two branches, the principal one through
NOT-INTEND(MARSOUND) and a less important one through INTEND(MARSOUND). Such detail is un-
necessary, however. A direct arrow from BELIEVE(MARSOUND) to CONDUCT adequately conveys, with
greater pictorial simplicity, the assumption that if BEUEVE(MARSOUND) is true then the conduct was
probably neither intended as an assertion of MARSOUND nor an inarticulate assertion of another pro-
position. Where that assumption is open to question, see, e.g., infra note 120, the extra complexity is
necessary.
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this problem of ambiguity is made more difficult to resolve by Ellershaw's
absence from the courtroom; if he were to testify, subject to cross-
examination, the jury could better judge whether he might have acted the
way he did even if he believed that Marsden had lost his mind.
In sum, route analysis demonstrates visually that conduct offered to
prove the truth of an apparently implicit belief is beset by two
problems-the possibilities of failed perception and memory-in the same
manner as is ordinary hearsay evidence. A third potential problem, insin-
cerity, is present as well, albeit in mitigated form; the relevance of the
evidence does not depend upon the actor's having communicated sincerely,
but may be undercut by the possibility that he was attempting to commu-
nicate insincerely. And although there may be no serious problem of inar-
ticulateness per se, there is a broader problem of ambiguity, because there
may be one or more plausible explanations for the actor's conduct, apart
from the possibility of an insincere communication, that do not depend on
the actor's having believed the material proposition.
In the actual case, these problems prompted the House of Lords to af-
firm the trial court's exclusion of the evidence as hearsay.1 ' But the rule
of Wright has proven unpopular, and the Federal Rules of Evidence de-
cline to classify conduct similar to Ellershaw's as hearsay. Instead, the
rules treat such conduct as if "not intended as an assertion," and so not a
Rule 801(a) "statement" capable of being treated as hearsay, or as if as-
sertive yet "offered as a basis for inferring something other than the mat-
ter asserted, [and therefore] excluded from the definition of hearsay by the
language of [Rule 801(c)]." '"9 In terms of our diagrams, the hearsay rules
do not apply because the route from BELIEVE(X) to CONDUCT does not
lead through INTEND(X).
As a generalization, however, this is insufficient. In some cases, as we
have seen, there may be a significant path from NOT-BELIEVE(X) to CON-
DUCT through INTEND(X); it is therefore begging the question of whether
BELIEVE(X) or NOT-BELIEVE(X) is true to admit the evidence on the
ground that the conduct is nonassertive. 2 ° True, the danger of an insin-
118. For an interesting discussion of the background of and issues in this celebrated case, see
Maguire, supra note 46, at 749-60.
119. FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee's note.
120. The draftsmen of the Federal Rules acknowledged that their approach often requires a diffi-
cult preliminary determination of whether an assertion was intended. Id. The problem is not only that
the path to CONDUCT may have passed from NOT-BELIEVE(X) through INTFND(X)-i.e., that the con-
duct may actually be a dishonest communication of x. It may also be unclear whether the path from
BELIEVE(X) to CONDUCT goes through iNTEFND()-in other words, whether the conduct might have
been a sincere attempt to communicate x. Suppose that in our slip-and-fall case, see supra note 57
and accompanying text, the plaintiff, to prove that there was ketchup on the floor, offers proof that a
few minutes before the accident another shopper out of her earshot told his child, "Don't step in the
ketchup!" That communication could have been intended to include an assertion ("There is ketchup
there. Don't step in it!") or merely as a nonassertive imperative ("Don't step in the ketchup that we
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cere communication is less when it is uncertain, and indeed unlikely, that
the conduct was assertive. But even if this is so, that very uncertainty
often converts the narrow problem of inarticulateness into the broader one
of ambiguity. In some cases, there may be no real ambiguity; the conduct
may be consistent only with the actor's belief in the truth of the material
proposition. It seems difficult to make any valid generalization, however.
Wholesale rejection of the Wright rule represents a pragmatic hostility to,
rather than a consistent application of, hearsay doctrine.
IV. CONCLUSION
Route analysis offers a method for displaying visually how a jury
should consider the effect of retrospective evidence-the most important
type of evidence in judicial proceedings-on the probability of a disputed
proposition. The jury should ask: "How probable did the disputed pro-
position appear prior to the new evidence? How probable is it that the
evidence would arise if the disputed proposition were true? How probable
is it that the evidence would arise if the disputed proposition were not
true?" The same general technique applies when the evidence supporting
a proposition x is a witness' testimony of x, proof of an out-of-court dec-
laration of x, or proof that a person acted in a way apparently reflecting a
belief that x is true. The technique also applies when the material pro-
position in dispute is not x, but, for example, another proposition infera-
ble from x, or the proposition that a person believed x, or the proposition
that a person declared x.
This congruence is perhaps the most significant advantage of route
analysis in considering credibility and hearsay, for the analysis shows how
much problems in these areas have in common with other problems of
factual inference.1" 1 To say that the same technique applies is not, of
course, to say that it should be applied uniformly. On the contrary, a
complementary advantage of route analysis is its flexibility: The diagram
for a particular case is drawn to suit the needs of that case. By demanding
an assessment of the prior probability of the material proposition-for
that is the first of the three questions set forth above-route analysis ap-
both recognize is there [so that I needn't tell you about it and can refer to it with the definite arti-
cle]!"). This type of uncertainty raises interesting issues for transformational grammarians. See, e.g.,
R. HUDDLESTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH TRANSFORMATIONAL SYNTAX 6, 127-45 (1976).
It is doubtful, though, that an evidentiary ruling should depend on their resolution.
121. A provocative piece suggests that the admissibility of an item of evidence should be deter-
mined in the same manner for "all types of evidence," including hearsay, "by balancing its value
against the residual gap (i.e., the disparity at the end of the trial) between expected jury perception
and absolute reliability." Note, supra note 52, at 1791; see also id. at 1787-90 (outlining general
decision rule); cf id. at 1804-07 (exclusion of hearsay is inconsistent with usual rules governing roles
of judge and jury).
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propriately places the evidentiary problem in the context of the rest of the
case. The second and third questions require close examination of the re-
lation between the specific proposition at issue and the evidence of it. A
properly-drawn route diagram aids this examination, enabling an analyst
to consider the possible hypotheses of how the material proposition could
be false notwithstanding the evidence, and to determine which of these
hypotheses could adequately be considered only with cross-examination.
Route analysis, in short, is a comprehensive method for diagramming
problems of factual inference, with ready application to problems of credi-
bility and hearsay. Any analysis made with the diagrams could also be
made without them, on the basis of clear, logical thought. But it is diffi-
cult enough to think clearly about intricate problems, and we should read-
ily accept any available aid. Route diagrams offer assistance to those who,
-when required to understand a complex situation, are prone to ask, "Can
you draw me a picture?"
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APPENDIX A
Section II.A. criticizes a simple credibility model under which a number representing
credibility is assigned to each witness. That number is the probability of a proposition
given the witness' testimony to the proposition, and it is assessed without reference to the
probability of the proposition before the testimony. This Appendix demonstrates the math-
ematical incoherence in this model.
Assume the simple case in which witness W must admit or deny proposition x; he has
the choice of testifying to x or NX.ss Assuming the simplified model of credibility is coher-
ent, there is a number C that represents both the probability that x is true given W's
testimony of x and the probability that Nx is true given W's testimony of NX. That is,
P(XIT(X)) = P(NXIT(NX)) = C. (Al)
A lengthy proof, however, shows that, whatever the value of C, there are propositions for
which this relationship cannot hold. More precisely, the model breaks down if either (i) C
+ P(x) > 1 and P(x) > C, or (ii) C + P(x) < 1 and P(x) < C.1 3 For example, if
C = 0.8, there is no proper solution to these equations if P(x) < 0.2 or P(x) > 0.8;
thus, if our prior estimate of the probability of x is 0.9, we cannot rationally conclude-as
the simplified credibility model demands we should-both that the probability of x, given
W's testimony of x, is 0.8 and that the probability of NX, given W's testimony of NX, is
0.8. This impossibility is not disturbing if we are not bound to the simplified model, for
122. In the appendices, a notation more compact than that in the main text will be used. NX is
equivalent to NOT-X, a vertical line I means "given"; and T(X) means TESTIMONY(X).
123. Applying Bayes' Theorem to Equation Al, we can write:
P(x) X P(T(X) I X) = C (A2)
P(T(x))
and
P(NX) X P(T(NX) I NX) = C. (A3)
P(T(NX))
And, because P(x) + P(Nx) = P(T(X)) + P(T(NX)) = P(T(X) I NX) + P(T(NX) I NX) = 1, we
can express Equation A3 as
[1 - P(x)] X [1 - P(T(x)INx)] f C. (A4)
I - P(T(X))
We also know that
P(T(x)) - [P(x) X P(T(X)I X)] + ([I - P(x) X [P(T(X) I NX)]). (A5)
If the simple credibility model is coherent, there should be values of P(T(x)), P(T(x) Ix), and
P(T(X) I NX) that satisfy Equations A2, A4, and A5 for any proper values of C and P(x)-that is,
however credible the witness is and however probable the proposition is absent the testimony-or at
least for any reasonable values of C and P(x).
To solve this trio of equations, first restate Equation A2 as
P(x) X P(T(x) Ix) - C X P(T(X)). (A6)
Substituting the right side of this equation into Equation A5 and rearranging yields
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such a pair of conclusions would be highly surprising, if not irrational; it would mean that
W's testimony as t6 a proposition that previously appeared extremely probable lowers the
probability of that proposition to C.
APPENDIX B
This Appendix demonstrates that Professor Kaplan's failure to distinguish between
P(x I T(x)) and P(T(x) I x) severely undercuts his model of credibility. 124 It should be noted
at the outset that P(T(x) Ix) and P(X I T(x)) are not in fact identical. For example, sup-
pose that P(x) - 0.6, P(T(x) Ix) = 0.8, and P(T(X) I NX) = 0.4. Then by Bayes'
Theorem,
P(T(x)) = (1 - P(x)) X P(T(X) I NX)
1 - C (A7)
Substituting this expression for P(T(x)) into Equation A4 and rearranging then gives
P(T(X)INX) (1- P(x) - C) (1 - C) (A8)(1 - P(x))(1 - 2C)
Using the relationship between P(T(x)) and P(T(X) I NX) shown in Equation A7, Equation A8 leads
to
P(T(x)) 1 - P(x) - C
1 - 2C
And then using the relationship between P(T(x)) and P(T(x) Ix) shown in Equation A6, Equation
A9 gives
P((x)Ix) = C X (1 - P(x) - C)
P(x) X (1 - 2C) (AI0)
If C + P(x) > 1 and P(x) > C, there is no satisfactory solution of Equation A8: if C < , the
numerator of the fraction is negative and the denominator positive; if C = , the fraction is unde-
fined; and if C > , both numerator and denominator are negative, but the numerator is larger in
absolute value. Similarly, if C + P(x) < I and P(x) < C, there is no satisfactory solution of
Equation A10.
124. See Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1086-91.
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P(x I T(X)) P(x) X P(T(X) 
IX)
P(X) X P(T(X)Ix) -+ [1-P(x)] X P(T(X)IN X)
0.6 X 0.8
(0.6 X 0.8) + (1-0.6) X 0.4
0.48
0.64 0.75.
And this, of course, is not equal to P(T(x) I x), which by hypothesis equals 0.8. P(x I T(X))
would equal P(T(x) I x) in this case if P(T(x) I NX) were 0.3 instead of 0.4, but that would
be a mere coincidence.
Professor Kaplan does not distinguish between P(X I T(X)) and P(T(x) Ix). Professor
Kaplan discusses his approach to credibility in the context of a case in which a witness
declares that the defendant left town after the crime. Kaplan then seeks to determine "the
ultimate L" for this evidence, which is "the ratio of the probability of finding this piece of
evidence if the defendant were guilty to the probability of finding it if he were inno-
cent." 1"' The numerator of this ratio is "the probability that the witness would state that
he saw the defendant leaving town if the defendant were in fact guilty." We may call this
probability P(T(R) I G). Kaplan expresses it as [P(R I G) X A] + [(1 - P(R I G)) X (1 -
A)], where P(R I G) is the probability that the defendant would run if guilty and A is a
measure of the witness' accuracy.""' This expression correctly recognizes that there are two
paths by which events might proceed from the defendant's guilt to testimony of his
flight-it may be that the defendant did run and the witness testified accurately, or that
the defendant did not run and the witness testified inaccurately. To give the expression its
intended meaning, A must signify P(T(R) I R), the probability that the witness would testify
to flight given the fact of flight. But there is no reason to suppose that the probability that
the witness would testify to flight given that the defendant did not flee must be equal to 1
- A: there is no logical relation between P(T(R) I R) and P(T(R) I NR).
Kaplan apparently makes the oversimplifying assumption because he misunderstands
the meaning of A. Instead of treating A as a prospective probability, P(T(R) I R), he seems
to regard it as a retrospective probability, P(R I T(R)); for example, he defines A as "the
probability that the witness testified accurately."'' 1 It is true that if this did equal A, then
P(NR I T(R))-the probability that the witness testified inaccurately in asserting the defend-
ant's flight-must equal 1 - A, because the witness was either accurate or not but not
both. The difficulty is that the retrospective probabilities P(R I T(R)) and P(NR I T(R)) have
no place in the above stated expression for P(T(R) I G). A cannot mean what Kaplan seems
to think it means.
This confusion extends into Kaplan's attempts to break A down into components.
Kaplan states that "A may be expressed as the product of the probabilities: (1) that the
witness was not mistaken in what he saw; (2) that he has remembered what he thinks he
saw; (3) that he has meant to tell us what he remembered; (4) that he has actually been
125. Id. at 1087.
126. Id. Similarly, he expresses the denominator of the ratio as P(R I NG) X A + [1 - P(R I NG)]
X (1 - A). Kaplan actually uses a slightly different notation, but the difference is inconsequential.
127. Id.
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able to communicate what he intends to tell us; and (5) that we have correctly understood
what he has communicated."' "
Kaplan's suggestion of breaking the credibility measure down by the individual testimo-
nial capacities is a useful one,"2' and he is correct that, if we put aside the very small
possibility of two compensating errors, A may be expressed as a product.130 But he has
misstated the components. If, as I have suggested, A = P(T(R) I R), Kaplan should have
stated the components in the subjunctive mood rather than in the indicative past tense.
They should be the probabilities that: (1) if the defendant ran the witness would correctly
perceive this; (2) if the witness perceived it he would remember it; (3) if he remembered it
he would intend to communicate it; (4) if he so intended he would in fact communicate it;
and (5) if he communicated it we would understand it.
13 1
Although assessing the prospective probability P(T(R) I R) may be helpful to the jury by
Bayesian reasoning, it is the retrospective probability P(R I T(R)) that the jury really must
determine. Because that probability looks backwards, it may be divided into components
that describe an inferential chain from T(R) back to R. They are the probabilities that: (1)
given what we understood the witness to testify, it is what he communicated; (2) given
what the witness communicated, it is what he intended to communicate; (3) given that he
intended to communicate this message, it was in fact what he remembered; (4) given what
he remembered, it was what he actually perceived; and (5) given what he perceived, it was
what actually occurred.113
APPENDIX C
Section II.A. suggests that C(x), the credibility ratio for a given witness W, is greater
than 1 if the witness is not a pathological liar. This suggests that W's declaration of x
should make x appear more probable than it was without the statement, although not
necessarily by very much. If all we know is that W has declared x, this is probably true.
But if a jury sees and hears W make the declaration, it may conclude that x is less proba-
ble than it was before the testimony. Is such a conclusion irrational?133 No, because the
128. Id. at 1088.
129. See supra Section II.D.
130. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1088.
131. To adhere to Kaplan's format, A here describes five links, rather than four as elsewhere in
this Article. The fifth link, understanding by the listener, may-especially as judged by the lis-
tener-be considered part of the fourth link, proper communication by the witness.
132. In United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir. 1977), the court described another
backwards-looking chain of inference, this one beginning essentially where the one described in the
text leaves off, with proof of behavior suggesting flight:
Its probative value as circumstantial evidence of guilt depends upon the degree of confidence
with which four inferences can be drawn: (1) from the defendant's behavior to flight; (2) from
flight to consciousness of guilt; (3) from consciousness of guilt to consciousness of guilt concern-
ing the crime charged; and (4) from consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged to
actual guilt of the crime charged.
133. Apart from the matter of demeanor, discussed in this Appendix, there is at least one other
explanation of why the jury would lower its estimate of the probability of x after learning of W's
declaration of x. It is possible that the jury assumes, because the issue is being litigated and because
one attorney has asserted x in her opening statement, that there is credible evidence of x. This as-
sumption is an improper one, because the jury is instructed not to treat the pleadings or the attorneys'
assertions as evidence, 1 E. DEVIrr & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS
§§ 11.11, 11.13 (3d ed. 1977) (assertions); 2 id. §§ 70.03, 71.10 (pleadings); that is, it should not
make the probability that it assigns to x depend on those advocacy statements. But suppose that, as
must often be the case, the jury makes the forbidden assumption. If W's testimony is disap-
pointing-that is, C(x) is lower than the jury anticipated-the jury may then lower its prior estimate
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manner in which W gives his testimony may in itself be a significant indication of whether
his statement is accurate.13'
P N=(T(X) I X)
P(D(X) IX & T(X))
P(Nx) = - P(x) R(x) =P(T(x) I NX)
FIGURE Cl
Figure C1 shows how this can be. D(x) represents W's demeanor in testifying to x.
Thus, P(D(x) I [x & T(X)]) represents the probability that W would display this demeanor
given that he testifies to x and that x is accurate, and P(D(x) I [Nx & T(X)]) represents the
probability that he would do so given that he testifies to x and that x is inaccurate. We
can then define a new term, the sweat factor S:
S(x,D(x)) =
P(D(X) I [NX & T(X)]).
P(D(x) I [x & T(X)])
(Cl)
S indicates whether W's demeanor in testifying to x is more suggestive of falsification (S
> 1, reflecting lowered eyes and profuse perspiration) or of truthtelling (S < 1, reflecting
cool calm and a stationary polygraph needle).
of the probability of x; the jury may reason that, if better evidence of x were available, the proponent
would present it in addition to, or in lieu of, W's shaky testimony.
134. Indeed, it may be that in some cases a factfinder may find a proposition to be true solely on
the basis of a witness' demeanor in testifying to the contrary of that proposition. See Dyer v. Mac-
Dougall, 201 F.2d 265, 270 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J., concurring and construing majority opinion,
by L. Hand, J., so to hold where judge is factfinder); In re Bebar, 315 F. Supp. 841, 844 (E.D.N.Y.
1970) (relying on Dyer to uphold referee's finding that fact was contrary to unrefuted testimony). But
see, e.g., United States v. Cisneros, 448 F.2d 298, 306 n.10 (9th Cir. 1971) (burden of proof cannot be
satisfied solely by demeanor evidence); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 784-85 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965) (if court could use "disbelief [of testimony] alone to support a finding
that the opposite was the fact . . . a case could be made for any proposition in the world by the
simple process of calling one's adversary and arguing to the jury that he was not to be believed"
(citation omitted)). The Janigan argument appears specious, or at least exaggerated. A court could
establish a rule allowing demeanor evidence to support a finding of some propositions but not others:
The more unlikely a proposition appears, apart from a witness' denial of it, the more suspicious the
witness must be to render the proposition probable.
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Looking at Figure CI, we can see how to define C'(X,D(X)), a measure of credibility
that takes into account S(x,D(x)) as well as the factors that determine C(x):
"(XD(X)) = Q(x) X P(D(X) I x & T(X)]) C(X) (02)
R(x) X P(D(X) I [NX & T(X)]) S(X,D(X))
We may also rewrite an equation used earlier1 35 to take this additional factor into ac-
count. Equation N2 expresses PV(T(x) w.r.t. x) in terms of P(x) and C(x). After substi-
tution of C'(x,D(x)) for C(x), the equation gives an expression for PV([T(X) & D(X)]
w.r.t. x): 1 36
PV([T(X) & D(X)] w.r.t. x) = P(x) X 11 - P(x)J X [C*(x, D(X)) - 1()[P(x) X C(x, n(x))] + [1 - P(x)]
Equation 02 shows that, if the S factor is greater than the C factor, C'(x,o(x)) is less
than one. Equation C3 shows that when this is so the substance and manner of the testi-
mony, taken together, lower the probability that the declaration is true. There may be
occasions when a witness' testimony is negatively persuasive. 1 7 But such a situation is
probably not very common, because the S factor is not often far above one: even the beaded
brow and the quavering voice may be the products of nervousness, illness, or heat rather
than of a guilty conscience.
APPENDIX D
This Appendix analyzes the lottery problem presented in Section II.C.131 It shows that
the route analysis model, properly applied, does jibe with our intuition: If Whitney, a
selector of apparent veracity, picks a lottery ticket at random and announces the result, it
is highly probable that her announcement is accurate, no matter how many tickets are in
the lottery.
The key consideration in understanding the problem is this: In determining the
probability that Whitney's announcement of ticket 297 is accurate, we must be able to
assess, inter alia, R(x 29 7)-the probability that Whitney would announce ticket 297 even
though she had chosen another of the 10,000 tickets. The R factor is not the probability
that W would make an inaccurate statement of the ticket number, but rather the much
smaller probability that she would make this particular inaccurate statement, announcing
ticket 297 rather than any other.
135. See supra note 30.
136. Making a similar substitution into Equation N1, see supra note 30, yields an expression for
P(xl I[T(X) & D(x)]):
C'(x,v(x))
P(XI[T(X) & D(X)]) = (cNI)I - P(x)
P(x)
137. See, e.g., Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1952).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
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Figure Dl helps us to explore and understand the significance of this consideration. Here,
x297 represents the proposition that the ticket with number 297 has been selected (the
diagram could easily be relabelled for a ticket bearing any number i), and A represents the
proposition that Whitney has stated accurately the number of the selected ticket. Suppose
we can assign a probability A' to represent the proportion of times that Whitney will state
the number of the ticket accurately, whatever the number," ' and that in this case
A' = 0.99.
Thus, P(A I X 2 9 7 ) = P(A I NX 2 9 7 ) = A' = 0.99, and consequently
P(NA I x 2 97 ) = P(NA I NX 29 7) = 1 - A' = 0.01. If the ticket is 297 and Whitney
speaks accurately she will definitely announce 297. Similarly, if the ticket is 297 and she
speaks inaccurately, or if it is not 297 and she speaks accurately, she will definitely not
announce 297. Thus, P(T(X2 97 ) 1 [X 29 7  & A]), = P(NT(X2 97 ) 1IX297 & NA]) =
P(NT(X 297)1 [NX297 & A]) = 1. But if the ticket is not 297 and she speaks inaccurately,
there is only one chance in 9999 that she will announce 297. There are 9999 possible
wrong announcements that Whitney could make, and selecting 297 is just one of them, so
P(T(X297)1 [NX 2 97 & NA]) equals 1/9999.
With the help of Figure Dl, we can distinguish between two routes to the announce-
ment of a particular numbered ticket. Along one, the substance of the statement is correct,
and the witness testifies accurately. If xi is true, the probability that Whitney will declare
it-that is, P(T(xi) I Xi)-is simply P(A I xi), because if she testifies accurately she will nec-
essarily testify to xi. Along the other route, the statement is incorrect and the witness not
only testifies inaccurately but makes the particular misstatement at issue. P(T(xi) I NXi)
therefore equals P(NA I NX) X P(T(Xi) I [NX i & NA]). By definition, the credibility ratio
C(xi) equals the quotient P(T(xi) I xi) - P(T(Xi) I NXi). Accordingly, it may be expressed
as
C(Xi) =P(T(Xi) I X;)C Xi) P(T(Xi) I NXi)
P(AIx)
P(NA I NXi) X P(T(Xi) I [NX i & NA])
1
A"(xi) X P(T(X) I [NX i & NA]) (DI)
where A" equals P(A I xi) - P(NA I Nxi) and so, on the assumption that a probability A'
can be assigned, also equals A' 4 (1 - A'). 1" In this particuI-" case, A"(x297) equals
0.99 - 0.01, or 99, and P(T(X2 97 ) I [NX 2 97 & NA]) equals 1/999;, so C(x 297 ) is very large,
139. This assumption of equality is made here for simplicity. In this case it is perfectly plausible.
Unless Whitney has an interest in announcing, or in not announcing, a given number, or unless the
chance that she will innocently misread the ticket is greater or less for one number than for others,
there is no reason to suppose that the assumption in the text does not hold. In some cases, however,
the assumption is not accurate (for example, if Whitney is dyslexic, she might be especially susceptible
to misreading a 6 for a 9), and the analysis would be more complex numerically, but not conceptually.
140. This follows immediately from the definition of A'. By simple algebraic manipulations, we
can also write
A'= (DNI)
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(9999)(99) or 989,901. Plugging this number and the value of P(x 297), 0.0001, into Equa-
tion NI,' 41 we have
P(x.97 I T(x.17)) (9999)(99)
(9999)(99) + 0.9999
0.0001
(9999)(99) - = 99%. (D2)(9999)(99) T 9999
This is just what we expect intuitively. In fact, this probability would remain substan-
tially the same no matter how many lottery tickets there are.' 4 2 In effect, though the
event-selection of a particular ticket-is unexpected, so too would be inaccurate testimony
that this particular ticket was the one chosen. The two low probabilities cancel each other
out, and our assessment of Whitney's propensity to tell the truth in this situation deter-
mines how probable we are to regard her statement to be accurate. 143
141. See supra note 30.
142. Assume that there are n lottery tickets, each equally likely to be chosen, one of them num-
bered 297. Thus, P(x297) = 1/n and P(T(X297) I [Nx 297 & NA]) = 1/(n - 1). From Equation D1,
C(x 2 97) = A" - [1/(n - 1)] = (n - 1)A". Inserting this value and the value for P(x 29 7) into
Equation N1, supra note 30, we have:
(nt - 1)A °"
P(x ,, I T(X2,,)) 
=
1 - 1/n(n -1)A" +- 1/n
(n- 1)A"
(n- 1)A" + (n - 1)
A"
(DN2)
Moreover, we know, see supra note 140, that this equals A', which in our particular case equals 99%.
We have assumed that A' remains constant no matter how many lottery tickets there are. In the
main, this assumption should hold true: If a ticket reads 297, Whitney's chance of stating the number
accurately should not ordinarily be affected by how many other numbers the ticket might have borne.
It is conceivable, though, that Whitney is somewhat more likely to get confused if she knows the ticket
is one of a very large number. And if the ticket bears a number containing many digits rather than a
three-digit number like 297, she may be slightly more prone to error.
143. Informally, we may note that the route through x 297 to T(X 297) has two heavy links and one
light one, whereas the route through NX297 to T(X297) has only one heavy link and two lights ones.
Thus, the former is far more probable.
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APPENDIX E
This Appendix examines, in a non-empirical way, whether stress increases the sincerity
of a declarant. The excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule is justified on the theory
that the startling condition leaves the declarant little opportunity for conscious fabrication.
Assuming that this is true-and it may well be-the excitement increases P(I(x) I (X)),
the probability that if the declarant believes proposition x he will attempt to articulate
it."" That, however, is not the ultimate question; we know that he has made a statement,
and the question is whether what he has articulated is what he believes. In a shorthand
form of notation, we will assume that the stress increases P(I(x) I B(X)), where i(x) repre-
sents the declarant's intention to articulate x and B(x) represents his belief in x. To im-
prove our assessment that the declarant is sincere, however, it is P(B(x) I i(x)) that must
increase.
An increase in P(I(X) I B(X)) is not sufficient to meet this condition, for the stress may
also increase P(I(X) I NB())-the probability that the declarant will attempt to assert a
fabrication, perhaps self-serving. In other words, the principal effect of the stress could
well be to loosen the declarant's tongue, causing him to blurt out something. Thus, the
tongue-loosening effect does not necessarily increase the probability, given the fact that the
decdarant has blurted out something, that what he says is what he believes. That depends
on whether the stress has a greater proportionate impact on the probability of blurting out
the truth or on the probability of blurting out a falsehood.
To see this, note first that under Bayes' Theorem, as expressed in the form of Equation
2 supra,
P(B(x) I = P(B(X)) X P(I(x) I B(X)) (El)P(x)) (l
This can be reformulated by expanding the expression for P(I(x)) in accordance with
Equation 1 supra:
P(B(X) I I(X))= P(B(X)) X P(x(x) I B(X)) (E2)
P(B(X)) X P(I(X) I B(X)) + [1 - P(B(X))] X P(I(X) I NB(X))
Then divide both numerator and denominator of the right-hand side by P(I(X) I NB(X)),
yielding
P(B(X) I P(B(X)) X L(i(x) w.r.t. B(X)) (0)
P(B(x)) X L(i(x) w.r.t. B(x)) + [1 - P(B(x))]
where L(x(X) w.r.t. B(x)), which is the likelihood ratio of i(x) with respect to B(X),1
45
equals the quotient P(I(x) I B(X)) + P(I(X) I NB(X)). From this equation, it can be seen
that, for a given prior probability of B(X), the greater the likelihood ratio is the greater the
posterior probability, P(B(x) I i(x)), will be.
Thus, stress causes P(B(X) I I(X)) to be greater than it would be otherwise only if the
144. In the longer notation of the main text, this probability would be denoted P(INTEND(X)
given BEIEVE(X)).
145. See supra text accompanying note 27.
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stress causes P(i(x) I B(x)) to increase proportionally more than P(I(x) I NB(X)). It is by no
means clear that this is usually true.
APPENDIX F
Section III.B.1. of the text used several route diagrams to present variations of the
Hillmon problem. This Appendix shows that even a complex variation of the problem can
be presented in a single diagram. Figure F1 presents essentially the same information as
Figures 13, 14, 15, and 17. This diagram uses double arrows, as do Figures 9, 10, and 12
and two-section nodes, as do Figures 5, C1, and Dl. The variation mapped here is the
same one for which Figure 17 was used, in which Hillmon's intent is heavily dependent on
Walters'. A different diagram would be necessary to present the variation for which Fig-
ure 16 was used, in which this assumption need not hold.
As in the text, Walters' statement is construed to be a declaration of two propositions, w
and H.146 As in Figure 13,j,1" the material proposition at issue, can be true only if w and
H are both true, and not necessarily even then. As in Figures 14 and 15, an inference of w
is less troublesome than a direct inference of H, because it does not involve the hearsay
dangers of misperception and failed memory. But, as in the situation represented in Figure
17, H can be inferred from w, without relying on the declaration of H, because P(H I w) is
so much greater than P(NH I W). (Also, as in Figure 17, H cannot be true unless w is also
true, as indicated by bars across the NW-H link.) Accordingly, a juror might trace the links
from DEC(W) back to w, then to H and from there to j.1 1s
Thus, this diagram, although obviously less digestible than the series of diagrams
presented in the text, has some advantages in that it gives an overview of the problem, and
shows in one map how the jury may make the desired inferences while bypassing the
forbidden hearsay route. It also demonstrates the adaptability of route analysis, showing
that a route diagram may be drawn even for an extraordinarily complicated problem.
146. Referred to in the text as WALTPLAN and HILLPLAN, respectively.
147. Referred to in the text as JoiNTTRip.
148. DEC(X) is a shorthand way of stating what is referred to in the text as DECLARATION(X).
Similarly, PE(X), B(X), and I(x) are here used to represent the propositions that the declarant, respec-
tively, perceived, believed, and intended to declare proposition x.
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